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Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to determine what
factors account for variations in voter turnout in Louisiana
contested nonpartisan trial and intermediate appellate court
elections.

The central questions to be addressed are;

(1)

what is the precise relationship between incumbency or prior
judicial experience, campaign spending,
judicial candidates, ceteris paribus

and the race of

(with all else

remaining the same), on electoral participation in judicial
elections
(2)

in the State of Louisiana from 1981 to 1988 and

is the electorate that participates in judicial

elections typical or atypical of the electorate that
participates in presidential general races in terms of their
demographic characteristics?
Based upon my assessment of existing
state nonpartisan judicial elections,

literature on

the present research

adds considerably to what has not been explained with
regards to factors which may influence voter turnout in
these elections.

Existing

literature indicate that much

research needs to be conducted on the subject of state
judicial elections.

Voter turnout

in judicial elections has

almost been ignored by scholars who have focused their
attentions on electoral participation in major partisan
contests such as presidential,
gubernatorial.
voter turnout

Furthermore,

congressional,

or

researchers who have considered

in judicial elections have focused their
vi
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attentions on electoral participation in state supreme court
elections.

This dissertation represents my attempt to fill

the void which exists in the literature on voter turnout in
state trial and intermediate appellate court elections.
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Chapter One
Introduction

With but a few exceptions,

scholars have not conducted

research to explain variations in electoral participation or
voter turnout in judicial elections.

Instead scholars have

devoted their attentions to analyzing voter participation in
congressional and presidential elections

(Verba and Nie

1972; Niemi and Weisberg 1976; Nie et al.

1976; Wolfinger

and Rosenstone 1980; Shaffer 1981; Conway 1981; Hinkley
1981a,

1981b; Caldeira and Patterson 1982; Burnham 1982;

Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Copeland 1983).

These scholars

have examined the effects of motivational, contextual, and
legal factors on whether or not a person votes.
Scholars have also devised rational actor models to
explain variations in voter turnout in elections (Downs
1957; Riker and Oidershook 1968; Cyr 1975; Kastosh and
Traugott 1982; Foster

1984).

These researchers sought to

explain why people choose to vote or not to vote in American
elections.
Downs (1957)

Of these models,

the rational actor model of

is most well-known.

According to Downs, people

choose to vote because they perceive their vote as having an
impact on the outcome of elections.
Riker and Oidershook
model

In a similar vein,

(1968) devised the calculus of voting

in which they argued that people are rational actors

who weigh the benefits and costs of voting before deciding

1

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

2

to participate in elections.

In other words,

if voters

believe the benefits of voting outweigh the costs of voting,
they are more likely to go to the polls and vote.

Not only

has research revealed that voters do a cost-benefit analysis
when deciding whether or not to vote, voting has also been
examined in terms of its instrumental and expressive
benefits.

According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone <1980, 76),

"an example of an instrumental benefit is those people who
vote because they are paid to do so.

Expressive benefits

involve equating voting with a feeling of carrying out o n e ’s
civic d u t y . "
Other scholars have disputed the findings of Downs and
Riker and Oidershook.

Ferejohn and Fiorina

introduced the "paradox of not voting"
According to these researchers,

(1974)

in their research.

it is negligible that a

single vote will be decisive in even competitive elections.
They also emphasize that a direct relationship does not
exist between the closeness of elections and turnout.
Despite the findings revealed
turnout for national offices,

in these studies of

little research has been

devoted to explaining variations in electoral participation
in judicial elections.

For this reason,

the present study

is devoted to examining the factors which may stimulate or
depress voter turnout in judicial elections.
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Importance of Judicial Election Studies
The lack of scholarly attention devoted to analyzing
judicial elections cannot be attributed to the traditional
view held by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers,
N o . 78 (1788) that the Supreme Court or the judiciary would
be the "least dangerous branch" of the federal government.
Alexis de Tocqueville (1961, 2) provided a more accurate
view of the role of the judiciary when he stated that
"scarcely any political question arises in the United States
that is not resolved,

sooner or later,

into a judicial

q u e s t i o n ."
It is important to emphasize that researchers have not
completely ignored the importance of the judiciary in
American society.

For example,

scholars have examined

judicial behavior or decision-making

(Nagel

1977; Goldman and Sarat

1978; Spaeth 1979; Tate

1981)

1978; Miller

and its impact on public policy.

1962; Woodford

The previous comment

requires one to differentiate between research on judicial
behavior,

in general,

and that of judicial elections.

As previously stated,

the role of the judiciary in the

American political system has not been completely ignored by
scholars.

The argument

I put forward

is that trial and

intermediate appellate judicial elections,

particularly

nonpartisan district court elections, have for the most part
not received scholarly attention because they have not been
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viewed

in the same light as legislative races for four main

reasons.
The first explanation has to do with the view that
legislators represent the people and judges may not.

Two of

the main functions of members of Congress are providing
services to constituents and the representation of diverse
interests

(Fiorina 1977; Arnold 1979; Parker 1980; Bond

1985; Parker and Parker

1985).

Services to constituents are

considered casework or personal work members of Congress
perform for their constituents.

The importance of casework

to the elections of Congresspersons has been pointed out by
Fenno

(1978).

Like Fenno, Fiorina

(1974) and Bond

(1985)

argue that the activities or services members of Congress,
particularly House members, provide for their constituents
help to build a relationship of trust between the
legislators and their constituents.
Another role of members of Congress is representation
of the views of their constituents.

Wahlke et al.

coined terms to explain the representational
legislators.

According to these scholars,

(1962)

function of

legislators’

perceptions of their role determine how they carry out their
duties.

The first view of representation, according to the

authors,

is the trustee view— the legislator "claims to rely

on his own conscience on what he thinks is right"

(286-87).

In contrast to the trustee view is the instructed—delegate
view of representation.

This view is based on legislators

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
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"seek(ing) and follow(ing)

instructions from his

constituents or other clienteles"
al.

(1962, 286).

Wahlke et

(1962) concluded that legislators did not perceive their

roles as a pure trustee nor a pure instructed-delegate.

The

authors referred to this representational role as politico
in which the legislator "claim that he will adopt one or the
other orientation (trustee or instructed-delegate)

as

conditions call for, and that he must balance one against
the other (Wahlke et al.
According to Jewell
state legislatures,

1962, 286).
(1969,

1982)

in his examination of

"role is defined by the total pattern of

expectations concerning a position,
person occupying that position.

including those of the

The role of a legislator

is

defined by his own belief about what the job requires and
also by the expectations of all others who make demands on
him"

(1969, 84).

The author referred to Wahlke et al.

(1962) concepts of "trustee" and "delegate."

Jewell

considered these concepts part of the representational role
of legislators.

He defined the representational role as

"the degree to which they (legislators) feel obliged to rely
on their own judgment in making decisions"

(1969, 90).

Jewell also defined the "client" role of legislators.

The

"client" role defines his (legislator) relationship with the
various groups that make demands on him— including his
party,

the executive branch, his constituents,

and interest

groups (1969, 90).
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David s o n ’s (1969,

117) sampling of members of Congress

demonstrated that about the same proportion endorsed the
trustee (28 percent) and delegate (23 percent) approaches to
representation, but the clear preference was for the
politico position— which combines the perspectives of both
the trustee and the delegate in a pragmatic mix.
The question of representation by judges surfaced as a
result of challenges to judicial election systems.
important question is:

The

are judges actually representatives

of the people or do they serve different functions than that
of other elected officials?

Because judges rely upon

written laws and statutes when reaching their decisions,
judges may be viewed as being different from other public
officials.

Judges have not been traditionally viewed as

representatives of the people (Vines 1969; Flango et al.
1975; Abraham 1975; Goldman and Sarat
1980; Pruet and Click 1986; Haydel

1978; White 1978; Ely

1989; Hickok

1990).

According to Pitkin (1967), there are two types of
representation.

Descriptive representation refers to the

election of public officials who reflect the ethnic, racial,
and socioeconomic characteristics of the election district.
Substantive representation refers to the policy alternatives
preferred by these elected officials and whether they
reflect the needs and demands of the voters
60-91).

(Pitkin 1967,

Minorities who have challenged state election

systems contend that "elected black officials supposedly

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.
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will be more responsive to the needs and demands of the
black electorate than white elected officials can be"
(Fainstein and Fainstein 1974; Engstrom and McDonald 1986).
In addition to differentiating between two types of
representation, Pitkin (1967) also addressed the issue of
judges as representatives.
Bentley

(1949), and Pitkin

representatives.

According to Hogan (1945),
(1967),

judges are

Pitkin (1967) distinguishes between judges

as representatives of the state and as representatives of
societal pressures,
scholar,

thus the people.

According to this

"a judge is an agent of the state like all

government officials.

His pronouncements are not private

expressions of opinions, but official utterances of the
state.

Hence he represents the state"

Pitkin

(Pitkin 1967,

(1967) cites the work of Bentley

117).

(1949) for a

discussion of judges as representatives of societal
pressures.

Bentley

(1949) views judges as representatives

because their decisions are influenced by societal pressures
and popular demands.

Bentley states as follows:

so far from being a sort of legal
machine, they are a functioning part of
this government, responsive to the group
pressures within it, representatives of
all sorts of pressures, and using their
representative judgment to bring these
pressures to balance, not indeed in just
the same way, but on just the same
basis, that any other agency or
government does (1949, 393).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.
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In other words,

judges do not merely interpret the law.

Other factors play major roles in judicial decision-making
(Nagel

1962; Woodford

1977; Goldman and Sarat 1978; Miller

1978; Spaeth 1979; Tate 1981).

Among these factors are

group pressures and popular demands or public opinion.
When Chief Justice John Marshall established the
principle of judicial review in the case of Marburv v.
Madison (1803), he changed the direction and role of the
American judiciary as a mere interpreter of law or the
meaning of the United States Constitution.

The United

States Supreme Court's decisions in Marburv and in later
cases have led to judicial activism on the part of the
Supreme Court as well as other federal courts.

Judicial

activism involves the role of judges as policymakers.
Judicial activism means "the propensity of federal
mainly but not always on the Supreme Court,
the governing process,

to intervene in

so as to substitute their

for that of federal and state political officers"
1982, 6).

On the other hand,

judges,

judgment
(Miller

judicial restraint focuses on

judges as interpreters of law.
Obviously judges no longer simply say what the law is;
instead they make and influence public policy as a result of
their decisions.

This statement in addition to the

arguments of those who contend that

judges are actually

represents of the people (Hogan 1945; Bentley 1949; Pitkin
1967) may be substantiated by works focusing on the role of
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judges in the anti-drug crusades in the United States (Hagan
1980; Himmelstein 1983; Wisotsky 1986; Myers 1989).
most recent work is that of Myers (1989)

The

in which she

focuses on the sentencing patterns of judges in cases
involving drug offenders.
According to Myers (1989),

the severity of sentences

imposed on those found guilty of drug trafficking is
influenced by the context in which the decisions are made,
the involvement of the legislature in anti-drug crusades as
a response to constituents wishes,
offenders.

and the race of the

This researcher concludes that the harshness of

sentences is affected by popular demands.

This scholar

analyzes the behaviors of judges serving on Georgia state
courts from January 1977 through May 1985.
Myers (1989) found that after President Ronald Reagan
revealed his "war on drugs" crusade,

the severity of

sentences for drug offenders became harsher

in Georgia.

In

comparison with pre-1980 sentences, drug users and those
convicted of sale or distribution were most
incarcerated in 1980,
legislation was passed

likely to be

the year when comprehensive
(Myers 1989, 308).

One interesting finding of Myers

(1989) was that black

offenders received harsher sentences at the height of the
anti-drug crusade.

This finding is consistent with Peterson

and H a g a n ’s (1984) findings that the differences in
sentencing on the basis of race were functions of the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.
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offense as well as the political and social context when
sentencing occurred.

In other words," public opinion affects

the sentencing behavior of judges.
The judiciary has assumed a similar posture in other
controversial matters.

For example,

in 1914 the United

States Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule.
According to this rule, those accused of criminal activities
were granted specific rights.

Among these rights was the

provision that inadmissible evidence or evidence acquired
without a search warrant or a coerced confession could not
be used by prosecutors in criminal trials.
After much public pressure based on the belief that too
many "criminals" were being freed as a result of legal
technicalities,

the United States Supreme Court established

exceptions to the exclusionary rule,
devised years earlier.

the very rule the Court

In U.S. v. Pavner

(1980) the Court

ruled that searchers of third parties to obtain evidence
against another

individual

is constitutional and does not

violate the rights of the third party, since the evidence
relates to another party rather than the person or
possessions of the person being searched.

In U.S. v. Leon

(1984) the Court devised the "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule.

According to the "good faith" exception,

if police officers make a "good faith" effort to acquire a
search warrant,

the evidence the police find during a search

may be admissible in a court trial even if the warrant

is
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later found to be defective.

Another exception the Court

established is the third party search.
The judiciary may be said to be responding to an
increase in criminal behavior

in American cities as well as

public intolerance for such deviant behavior.
United State Supreme Court

Thus the

is willing to make exceptions to

its own precedents in an effort to deal with societal
pressures and problems.

Clearly the Court is creating law

rather than merely reaching decisions based on past rulings
or precedents.
The above discussion exemplifies the impact changes in
public opinion may have on the decision-making of judges.
Not only do judges say what the law i s , they also make law
or public policy which affect the lives of citizens.
Whereas judges may not be viewed as representatives in the
traditional sense as legislators are,

it is obvious that

judges do take into consideration the public will and good
when reaching decisions.

It may be contended that judges

make decisions based upon their knowledge of what the law is
and the impact their decisions will have on public policy.
Justice William Brennan

(1982) and Pitkin

(1967) summed

up the representative role of judges best in following
statements, respectively:

Under our system, judges are not mere
umpires, but, in their sphere,
lawmakers— a coordinate branch of
government (See Miller 1982, 1).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.
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Anyone in charge of another or (make)
decisions that affect him is his
representative....
If a trustee can
represent, and a guardian his ward, then
parents "really" represent their
children, and anyone in charge of
another or making decisions that affect
him is his representative.
Or again, if
a substitute or deputy represents, then
a physician represents his patients and
an engineer his clients, and indeed "any
specialization of function involves the
idea of representation" (Pitkin 1967,
120 ).
The findings of Welch et al.

(1988) on black judges

provide evidence which suggest that black
difference.

They found that black

judges do make a

judges do provide both a

descriptive and substantive form of representation.

The

authors analyzed the decisions of ten black judges and 130
white judges from 1968 to 1979.

They were interested in the

sentencing patterns of black and white judges.

Their sample

population consisted of 3,418 male defendants convicted of
felonies during this time period in a large northeastern
city, which they refer to as "Metro City."

Welch et al.

found that "black judges are more likely than white judges
to sentence white defendants to prison and to give less
severe sentences to black defendants"

(1988,

134).

On the

other hand, white judges were more lenient on white
defendants and harsher
defendants.

in their sentencing of black

According to the authors,

"black judges tend to

treat black and white defendants more equally than do white
judges"

(1988,

134).

Welch et al. concluded
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thus, black judges provide more than
symbolic
representation.
At least
those in Metro City also provide
substantive representation for black
defendants and presumably the black
community.
To the extent they equalize
the criminal justice s y s t e m ’s treatment
of black and white defendants, as they
seem to for the crucial decision to
incarcerate, they thwart discrimination
against black defendants.
In fact, the
quality of justice received by both
black and white defendants may be
improved (1908, 134).

Similarly, Smith

(1983,

voting behavior of black

18) in his analysis of the

judges serving on courts throughout

the United States found that "about one-third of black
judges believe that providing symbolic pride,

inspiration,

and status for blacks is an important function of their
service on the bench."

Additionally,

almost 40 percent of

the black judges in his study believed an important function
of black

judges is to behave in a manner to reduce racism in

the legal system.
Despite the findings of Welch et al.

(1988) and Smith

(1983), those challenging judicial election schemes base
their arguments on allegations of violation of Section S of
the Voting Rights Act, the Fourteenth Amendment

(Equal

Protection Clause), and the Fifteenth Amendment

(Right to

Vote).

The issue of representation has arisen as a response

to the plaintiffs’ lawsuits.
A second factor which has resulted in more attention
being focused on legislative races rather than judicial
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elections is gerrymandering, which is the drawing of
legislative district lines for the purpose of obtaining
partisan or factional advantage.

Gerrymandering may occur

as a result of "reapportionment,

or the allocation of seats

in the House of each state after the Census,

and

redistricting, the redrawing of the boundaries of
legislative districts within each state

(Keefe and Ogul

1964, 68-85).
Challenges to the reapportionment of legislative
districts resulted in the United States Supreme Court
invoking the "one-man, one-vote" principle of Article I,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution.

Another

issue

involved in the reapportionment of legislative districts is
the issue of at-large versus single-member districts.
Challenges to the issue of reapportionment of legislative
districts began in the early 1960s with the landmark case of
Baker v. Carr

(1962).

Earlier research indicated that at-

large districts dilute the voting strengths of minority
voters
Latimer

(Jones 1976; Taebel

1978; Robinson and Dye 1978;

1979; Engstrom and McDonald

1982; Karnig and Welch

1982).
Welch

(1990) contended that at-large election schemes

no longer result in the underrepresentation of minorities.
MacManus (1978,

1979) and Bullock and MacManus (1987)

agreed with W e l c h ’s contention.
scholars,

According to these

social scientists who have concluded that at-large
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election systems dilute minority voting strength base their
arguments on data collected

in the middle to late 1970s

(Svara 1977; Karnig and Welch
1982).

Welch

1982; Engstrom and McDonald

(1990) stated that these studies have ignored

the growth in black local representation since the 1970s.
Welch's

(1990,

1053) study "is based on a survey of

every U.S. city which had a 1984 population of at least 50
thousand and which had a minimum of 5 percent Hispanic or 5
percent black population in 1980."

The author conducted

mail questionnaires with city clerks employed
cities.

in these

The number of clerks responding to the

questionnaire was 314 (100% of the respondents).

The clerks

provided information on "the number of council members
elected at-large,

the number elected in single-member

districts or wards, and the number chosen in districts or
wards electing more than one member" (Welch 1990,

1053).

The author also requested the race or ethnicity and gender
of council members elected at-large.
Despite her contention that at-large election
structures no longer
minorities, Welch

lead to an underrepresentation of

(1990) concluded that "although at-large

elections represent blacks much better than a decade ago,
there is still a small gap between the representation
afforded by at-large and district systems.
hand,

On the other

the impact of local election structures on Hispanic
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representation is less clearcut and seems to vary from
region to region"

(1990,

1050).

Those challenging judicial election systems in
Louisiana and in at least six other states would disagree
with Welch's contention that at-large election structures no
longer result in the underrepresentation of minorities.
They would probably argue that the "gap" Welch referred to
still dilutes the voting strength of minorities.
The first case in Louisiana involving the issue of
minority vote dilution in judicial elections occurred in
1972 with Wells v. Edwards

(1973).

The issues involved

in

this case were reapportionment as well as representation.
The Louisiana Federal District Court's distinction
between the role of judges and legislators supported the
traditional view that judges are not actually
representatives of the people.

In Wells v . Edwards the

Federal District Court held that the concept of one-person,
one-vote does not apply to judicial elections because judges
do not represent the electorate in the same sense as do
legislators and members of the executive branch.

According

to Federal District Judges Ainsworth, Gordon, and West,
judges interpret the laws,

they do not make them.

Two lawsuits involving challenges to the at-large
system for electing city and state judges were filed in
1980.
V.

These two cases were Voter

Information Project,

City of Baton Rouoe and Fames v . Ed w a r d s .

Inc.

The plaintiffs
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in these cases contended that the at-large electoral system
violated provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.

As a result of the heavy burden of proof

required by plaintiffs in such cases, both cases were
dismissed.
intent

Plaintiffs were required to prove discriminatory

(Mobile v. Bolden

1980).

In 1982 the burden of proof or the showing of
discriminatory intent by plaintiffs was lessened when
Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights of 1965.
The U.S. Supreme Court also set the standard for
demonstrating vote dilution as a violation of Section 2 in
its decision in Thornburg v . Singles (1986).
the amending of Section 2 and
decision,

In response to

the C o u r t ’s Thornburg

three lawsuits challenging Louisiana’s judicial

election structure were filed by those acting on behalf of
black voters.
Chisom

V.

Edwards

(1987) commenced in the U.S. District

Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

The plaintiffs

in this case alleged that Louisiana’s at-large judicial
election scheme violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
as well as the Fourteenth and

Fifteenth Amendments.

The

case was dismissed, since the

district court agreed with the

defendants’ claim that Congress did not include the election
of judges when it enacted Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 because judges are not representatives.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

18
The plaintiffs appealed the case to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Court reversed the

ruling of the district court and remanded the case.

The

Fifth Circuit interpreted Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
as including judges, who are elected officials.
In 1988 Governor Charles Roemer became a party to the
lawsuit

in his capacity as Lo u i s i a n a ’s chief executive.

statutory and constitutional claims advanced in
Roemer were dismissed by the district court.

The

Chisom v.

The plaintiffs

appealed the district c o u r t ’s decision once again.

The

Fifth Circuit remanded the case once again to the district
court.

The case was later dismissed.

The Fifth Circuit

dismissed the appeal by relying upon its decision in Latin
American Citizens Council #4434 v . Clements (1990)

in which

the court held that judges are not representatives and
therefore were not included within the protections provided
by Congress in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
as amended in 1982.
To support its contention that judges are not
"representatives",

the Fifth Circuit referred to the case of

Buchanan v. Rhodes (1960)

in which the U.S. Supreme Court

concluded that "judges do not represent the people,
serve the people"

they

(385 U.S. 3).

In 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari to the plaintiffs in Chisom v. R o e m e r .

The Court

granted certiorari because the Fifth C i r c u i t ’s ruling in
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Chisom conflicted with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Mallory v. Evrich (1988).

Unlike the Fifth Circuit,

the

Sixth Circuit ruled that C o n g r e s s ’ inclusion of the word
"representatives"

in Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of

1965, as amended 1982, was not an intentional attempt to
exclude the election of judicial candidates.

According to

the Sixth Circuit, challenges to judicial election
structures were within the scope of the provisions of
Section 2.
The U.S. Supreme C o u r t ’s resolution of the dispute
between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in their
interpretations of the meaning of the word "representatives"
in Section 2 of the Voting Right Act is pending.
interesting factor

An

in the district as well as U.S. Supreme

Court judges preoccupation with the word "representative"

in

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is that legislative
material which accompanied the amendment of Section 2 in
1982 contained nine factors which should be considered when
deciding Section 2 violations.

Judges who have ruled on

cases involving vote dilution in judicial elections,

in

addition to, voting rights violations have chosen to ignore
these factors.

These nine factors are contained in Appendix

One.
A third reason judicial elections have not been
researched to the same degree as legislative races has to do
with the role of political parties or partisanship in state
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legislative races versus the role of parties in state
judicial contests.

Political parties play a greater role in

legislative contests than they do in state judicial races.
Whereas persons seeking legislative offices may campaign
upon the differing political philosophies of their parties,
judicial candidates must adhere to the American Bar
Association's Code of Judicial C o n d u c t .

This Code places

limits on judicial candidates who may wish to express their
opinions on public policy issues.

A candidate for judicial

office is instructed by the Code to "not make pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the duties of the office" and not
to "announce his views on disputed legal or political
issues"

(Code Canon 7 (B)(1)(C)).

As a result of the

limitations placed upon judicial candidates by the C o d e ,
"judicial candidates stress their personal qualifications
for the bench and their views on such subjects as the
administration of justice and court reform.
candidates compete on partisan ballots,

If judicial

they are permitted

by the Code to acknowledge a connection with a political
party, but the campaign necessarily must remain formally
nonprogrammatic.

And in states utilizing the nonpartisan

nomination and election method of selection,

state law

usually prohibits political party organizations from
offering endorsements to candidates and from engaging in
direct or indirect campaign activity on behalf of a
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candidate"

(Dubois 1980, 66).

In short, partisanship does

not serve the function of a voting cue in state judicial
elections as opposed to its role in the nomination and
election of legislators.
A final explanation for a lower level of research on
judicial elections when compared to legislative ones is the
saliency of legislative races.

Because of the prestige and

media attention given to members of Congress, congressional
office may be viewed as a more desirable and popular office
than a judgeship.

Furthermore,

office are usually uncontested.

the incumbents of judicial
In fact,

judges serve

longer terms in office than other officeholders.
other hand,

On the

legislators are contested for their seats which

result in political campaigns in an effort to win public
office.

Also "due to the issueless and lackluster

campaigns, critics argue that public attention to judicial
election contest

is low.

And due to this lack of interest,

it is argued that the public is not interested

in informing

itself about the qualifications of those candidates seeking
judicial office"

(Dubois 1980, 32-33).

Furthermore, voters are more likely to vote in
legislative races, since they believe the policy initiatives
of these officeholders affect their daily

lives.

In

contrast, most voters never come in contact with members of
the judiciary.

Legislators represent and promote policies

which are in the best interest of their constituents.

As a
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result, constituencies represented by particular

legislators

are more likely to re-elect them based upon the "benefits"
the legislators are perceived to have provided for their
respective districts or states
1974).

(Davidson 1969; Fiorina

When people vote for legislators or choose to

participate in such elections,

they do so because they

believe these candidates will act in their best interest.
Events of the late 1980s have resulted

in judicial

election systems receiving a considerable amount of
attention.

As a result of these events,

it is my opinion

that more research effort must be devoted to analyzing
judicial elections.

The events I am referring to are the

growing number of court cases challenging such elections
(Clark

V.

Edwards

1988; Chisom v. Edwards

Roemer 1990; Arnold v. Roemer

1987; Chisom v.

1988; LULAC v. Clements

1990;

Rangel v. Mattox 1988; Brooks v. Glvnn Countv, Georgia Board
of Election 1988; Williams v. State Board of Elections

1988;

Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Alabama v.
Siege 1man

1989; Mallorv v . Evrich

1988; Martin v . Mabus

1988; Al-Hakim et al. v. State of Florida 1988).

These

lawsuits are similar to lawsuits which have been filed
challenging

legislative districts.

They have been brought

alleging that minorities do not have an equal opportunity to
participate in elections and elect candidates of choice as a
result of discriminatory state judicial election systems.
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Minorities in Louisiana have based their arguments on
the fact that as recent as 1989, of the 239 judges serving
on courts of general

jurisdiction,

black state court judges.

there were only nine

Additionally,

only one black

judge sat on the Louisiana Court of Appeals and none on the
state Supreme Court.

The small number of black

judges in

Louisiana and other states and the lawsuits involving
allegations of violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments have increased the attention of scholars,
and federal

laymen,

judges to the impact of electoral participation

in state judicial elections.

Importance of Analyzing Voter Turnout in State
Judicial Elections
Researchers who have focused their attentions on
judicial elections as a result of recent challenges to such
races have limited their analyses largely to vote choice
(Weber 1988; Engstrom 1988), minority vote dilution
(Engstrom 1988,

1989; Weber

1989), statutory and

constitutional claims (Haydel
representatives

(Ely 1980; Pruet and Glick

1989; Hickok 1990).
is:

1989), or whether

judges are

1986; Haydel

What these scholars have not considered

what factors account for variations in voter turnout in

state trial and intermediate appellate court elections?
Likewise, the question which remains unanswered

is:

Is the

electorate that participates in state judicial elections
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different from the electorate that participates in other
elections— presidential and congressional?
noteworthy work

Furthermore, one

(Dubois 1980) focused on state supreme court

elections as opposed to district court elections.
The main line of argument advanced in this analysis is
even if district lines are redrawn to change the composition
of judicial districts into ones with an overwhelming number
of a certain race, particularly blacks or whites, will such
a change make state judicial election results more
democratic?

The likelihood of this occurring is very

unlikely, particularly if the people do not choose to
participate in such elections.

In other words,

if the

racial factor which results in racial polarization in voting
is remedied by changing the composition of districts, will
minorities choose to vote in such elections in reformed
systems?
In my opinion,

an examination of voter turnout in state

judicial elections should be treated with equal

importance

as constitutional and racial polarization or minority vote
dilution issues.

A focus upon the legal and constitutional

questions involved in challenges to state judicial elections
without emphasizing the fact that minorities are challenging
the drawing of district

lines which have the effect of

diluting their voting strength, not the fact that the size
of the white population exceeds the black or minority
population.

Emphasizing the former may eventually result
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a backlash for minorities, particularly in states such as
Louisiana with major cities consisting of large minority
populations.

I argue that just as affirmative action

policies and programs have led to reverse discrimination
cases (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
1978; United Steelworkers v. Weber

1979; Firefighters Local

Union No. 1784 v. Stotts 1984; Wvoant v. Jackson Board of
Education 1986), challenges to state judicial election
structures and particularly the fact that researchers have
not conducted studies on the major issue— gerrymandered and
at-large as opposed to single-member districts— will
eventually lead to whites challenging the composition of
election structures which allegedly dilute their voting
strength.

For example,

in 1987 white citizens in

Birmingham, Alabama filed a lawsuit challenging the election
process of selecting council members.

The plaintiffs

alleged that the votes of white citizens were being diluted
as the result of the present majority black population in
Birmingham.
To support my contention,
races in United S t a t e s ’ cities.

I turn attention to mayoral
The successes of black

mayoral candidates in the United S t ates’ cities have been
attributed to the large minority populations in such cities.
The victories of Coleman Young in Detroit, Ernest Morial and
Sidney Bartholemy in New Orleans, Harold Washington in
Chicago, and Maynard Jackson and Andrew Young in Atlanta
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occurred because of the support they received from the
majority black populations within their respective cities.
Rich

(1987) discussed the shifts in population in

Detroit during the Young administration.

The author

presented an analysis of Det r o i t ’s changing population which
may be generalized to explain transitions in the populations
of other American cities,

thus accounting for the victories

enjoyed by mayoral candidates in these cities.
Rich (1987, 201),

According to

"the flow of escaping white residents,

which began in the 1960s with the rise of racial tensions,
approached a floodtide in the 1970s when both middle and
working class whites began to move out.
population in 1970 was 838,877.
to 444,730.

D e t r o i t ’s white

By 1980 it had diminished

Between 1970 and 1988 D e t r o i t ’s black

population had actually increased from 672,602 to 758,939."
In other words, what has been referred to as "white flight"
from the cities account for the transition in the
populations of some American cities.

This has resulted in

electoral successes for black candidates,

specifically

mayoral candidates.
Unless judicial scholars provide research on the impact
previously drawn district

lines may have on the successful

election of minority candidates to the bench,

it is my

belief that many frivolous lawsuits will eventually be filed
by white voters residing

in U.S. cities with majority black

populations contending vote dilution on the basis of the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

27

size of the black population.

I refer to such lawsuits as

frivolous, since most would correctly argue that a minority,
specifically an African-American, will never become
President of the United States for the simple reason that
such a candidate would have a difficult time encouraging
crossover voting.

Despite this fact, blacks have not filed

lawsuits challenging the election of the President on the
basis that the white population in the United States is
larger than the black population.

Additionally,

whites have

not challenged electoral structures on the basis of white
vote dilution as a result of district lines which have been
redrawn by minority officeholders.

Instead whites have

challenged electoral structures which have been in place for
years only after blacks gain a majority within a particular
area.

Once again, s c h o l a r s ’ emphases on constitutional,

statutory, and representational claims without focusing on
the impact gerrymandered and at-large districts may have on
the successes of minority candidates does not provide laymen
nor federal

judges with a holistic nor accurate view of what

is actually occurring in terms of challenges to judicial
election systems.
The present s t u d y ’s emphasis on voter turnout in state
judicial elections is only one step in the direction of
providing much needed
process.

information on the judicial election

Just as researchers have examined and provided

explanations for variations

in voter turnout in
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presidential, congressional, and other elections
(Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975; Nie et al. 1976; Wolfinger and
Rosenstone 1980; Shaffer

1981; Caldeira and Patterson 1982;

Beyle 1983; Copeland 1983; Kenney 1983), this research
represents an attempt to provide an understanding of the
behavior of the electorate,

the type of election environment

which stimulates voter participation, as well as which
candidate attributes are more likely to motivate people to
vote in judicial elections.

Summary
As a result of legal challenges to state judicial
election structures,

scholars can no longer limit their

research agendas mainly to providing analyses of voter
behavior in highly contested races such as presidential,
congressional, and gubernatorial elections.

The willingness

of plaintiffs to bring lawsuits challenging judicial
election structures demonstrates that the electorate is
cognitive of the impact the judiciary or judges,
specifically state judges, have on public policies in
American society.
Political scientists attempt to interpret or explain
what occurs in the political arena on an international,
national,

state, and local government basis.

Therefore,

judicial scholars should include in their research efforts
examinations of electoral participation in judicial
elections.

Furthermore,

the recent

lawsuits challenging
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judicial election processes indicate that a body of
literature explaining the processes involved in such
elections is necessary.

A reliance upon legislative and

presidential literature cannot adequately explain what
occurs in state judicial elections.
A final observation involving the need for more
research on state judicial elections is the emphasis on
constitutional claims.

A preoccupation with the legalities

involved in such elections divert attention away from
electoral behavior in judicial elections.

Just as voter

behavior has been analyzed in presidential and congressional
races, electoral behavior in state judicial elections should
be given similar scholarly attention.

Additionally, a focus

on the constitutional and statutory claims involved in
challenges to state judicial elections without devoting
equal attention to the issue of at-large versus single
member districts may result

in white voters challenging

election structures they believe dilute their voting
strength.

To prevent the backlash which may result from

whatever changes are put in place to remedy minority vote
dilution in judicial races, scholars should educate voters
and judicial candidates on the factors which serve as
catalysts to encourage electoral participation as well as
crossover voting in state judicial contests.
of factors which stimulate voter turnout

An examination

in these elections

should provide an understanding of and information on which
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factors increase voter turnout as well as the electability
of judicial candidates.

Such research may reveal that black

judicial candidates might

increase their chances of winning

contests against white candidates if they
possess certain traits.

(black candidates)

For example, black candidates who

are able to raise and attract campaign expenditures may have
greater chances of drawing voters to the polls than black
candidates who do not have access to the funding necessary
to inform voters of their candidacy or the judicial
election.

Supporting judicial candidates who are most

likely to encourage crossover voting and attract campaign
expenditures is as important as changing the composition of
judicial districts.

In short, aiding in the understanding

of the game of politicking is equally important to the
success of judicial candidates as examining lawsuits
challenging such elections.
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Chapter Two
Voter Turnout in State Judicial Elections

Understanding the dynamics of voter turnout in state
judicial elections is important in order to make the
election of state judges a more democratic process.
Providing analyses of the factors which might encourage
electoral participation in such elections are crucial,
particularly in light of recent challenges to judicial
elections structures.

Furthermore,

because of the lack of

scholarly attention devoted to examining

judicial elections,

in most cases the only reference point available for
determining the impact of various factors on voter turnout
in state judicial elections is research which has focused on
non-judicial elections.
The works of scholars who have focused their attentions
on judicial elections may be divided
categories.

into two main

The first category includes those scholars who

have examined the impact contextual variables or the
judicial election context may have on voter turnout
judicial elections.

in state

The contextual factors these scholars

have considered in their research efforts are the scheduling
of judicial elections
Dubois 1980),

(Hannah 1972; Adamany and Dubois 1976;

the competitiveness of these elections

1972; Dubois 1980), type of election systems
and ballot format

(Hannah

(Dubois 1980),

(Dubois 1980).

31
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The second category consists of the characteristics of
judicial candidates.

These scholars are interested in the

influence candidate attributes may have on stimulating
electoral participation in state judicial elections.

This

category includes the works of Dubois (1984) on the gender
of judicial candidates; Collins

(1980), Atkins et al.

(1984), and Alozie (1988) on the race of these candidates;
Dubois

(1986) on the campaign expenditure of judicial

candidates; and Dubois

(1980) on incumbency or prior

judicial experience.
Both of these categories will be discussed in depth in
the following sections.

Impact of Contextual Variables
Election Scheduling
Scholars analyzing the effects of election scheduling
on electoral participation in state judicial elections have
found evidence which suggest similar findings as researchers
who have contended that general elections occurring during
presidential election years are characterized by an increase
in voter turnout.

For example, Angus Campbell

(1966)

distinguished between "core" and "peripheral" voters.
Campbell coined these terms to explain short-term variations
in voter turnout.

According to Campbell

(1966, 42-43),

"core" voters are those whose level of
political interest is sufficiently high
to take them to the polls in all
national elections, even those held in
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mid-term where the amount of stimulation
is low.
The "core" voters are joined in
the presidential years by the
"peripheral" voters whose level of
political interest is lower but whose
motivation to vote has been sufficiently
increased by the stimulation of the
election to carry them to the polls.

Campbell’s distinction between "core" and "peripheral"
voters indicates that the scheduling of elections does have
an impact on electoral participation.

This is evident by

the fact that high saliency races such as presidential
general elections encourage electoral participation.
One pioneering research effort
elections is that of Hannah

involving state judicial

(1972) who examined the levels

of voter participation, electoral competition, and the
political and socioeconomic basis of voting patterns in
Michigan’s nonpartisan elections for supreme court and
circuit court judges from 1948 to 1968.

Hannah measured

turnout as a percentage of the votes cast in the top
partisan race.

She found evidence which suggest that the

scheduling of judicial elections affects participation or
turnout in such elections.

Dubois (1980, 41-42) summed up

H a n n a h ’s results by stating that "judicial elections held
concurrently with the quadrennial presidential election had
the highest turnout, followed by those held concurrently
with the biennial gubernatorial elections in the mid-term
years, with the lowest turnout observed in the spring
elections."

Her results also indicated that judicial
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election turnout in any given election year was considerably
lower than turnout for more salient races at the top of the
ballot

(e.g., president, governor, or U.S. congressperson>.

In other words, Hannah found that rolloff occurred when
judicial elections were scheduled concurrently with more
salient races such as presidential, gubernatorial, or state
legislators.

Rolloff occurs when voters participate in

"major partisan offices" at the top of the ballot but fail
to cast ballots in the judicial elections

(Dubois 1979,

871 ) .
Adamany and Dubois (1976) analyzed Wisconsin supreme
court elections and confirmed H a n n a h ’s findings on Michigan
supreme court elections that election scheduling has an
impact on electoral turnout in judicial elections.

Dubois

(1980) also confirmed the earlier findings of Campbell
(1966) by conducting a state-by-state inspection of the
effects of election scheduling on voter participation or
turnout

in state supreme court elections.

that voter turnout was greatest

The author found

in presidential years, with

the exception of one state (Nevada).

Voter turnout was also

found to be higher during mid-term election years than in
judicial elections scheduled in off-years.

Dubois

(1980,

45) concluded as follows;

Election scheduling, therefore, explains
a great deal about judicial election
turnout.
Indeed, it is logical to
assume that the overall level of
participation in a s t a t e ’s judicial
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elections is largely a reflection of
turnout for the major statewide and
national contests which pull voters to
the polls in the first place.
It is
also true, however, that those states
with high levels of participation in the
major races of president, governor, and
United States Senator are not
necessarily the same as those with high
judicial election turnout.

Boyd

(1986) analyzed the effects of election calendars

as well as ballot forms on voter turnout in primaries and
statewide races held concurrently with 1976, 1980, and 1984
presidential elections.

According to Boyd, voter turnout is

effected by the type of races placed on the ballot which
increase the attractiveness of the ballot for voters.
example,

For

he found that the occurrence of a gubernatorial

race during the presidential year increases ballot
attractiveness thus increasing the likelihood that an
individual would vote.

Similarly,

Hannah

(1972) and Dubois

(1980) found that judicial elections placed on the ballot
during presidential elections were associated with increased
turnout.

However,

these authors attributed an increase in

electoral participation to the popularity of the
presidential race whereas Boyd associated increased voter
turnout to the popularity of gubernatorial or statewide
races.

Despite this discrepancy,

these authors concluded

that the presence of a salient race on the ballot will
increase overall voter turnout even in less visible races.
According to Boyd

(1989, 730), presidential and state

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

36

primaries divert resources away from the general election
and reduce turnout among the peripheral electorate who are
most dependent on a mobilization effort.

Whereas, Boyd did

not view the frequency of elections as causing voter
fatigue, thus decreasing voter turnout,

it may be argued

that both voter fatigue (Walker 1966; Dubois 1980) and the
dissipation of resources as a result of frequent elections
account for variations in voter turnout.

In other words, as

a result of the number of elections scheduled during a given
year, voters are more likely to participate in elections
they perceive to be the most important.

This observation

may be a plausible explanation for a decline in electoral
participation in less salient judicial elections held during
off-years or on schedules different than the regular primary
and general elections.

Election Svstems
Researchers who have studied the impact of election
system types on voter turnout in state judicial elections
have focused on differences in electoral participation under
partisan, nonpartisan,

merit retention, and mixed ballots.

The impact of election systems is most evident when voter
turnout in judicial elections is measured as a percentage of
the vote cast for the "major partisan office" at the top of
the ballot in an election year

instead of being calculated

as a percentage of the total voting age population.

Major

partisan office include the presidential, gubernatorial, or
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United States senatorial races which are the most salient
races.

Measuring voter turnout in this manner controls for

the effects of those races at the top of the ballot on voter
turnout.
Dubois (1980, 47) found when analyzing Wisconsin
supreme court elections that "the data more clearly suggest
that judicial election turnout is not solely the result of
election scheduling and turnout at the top of the ballot.
It appears that a greater percentage of voters complete
their

judicial ballots in states utilizing partisan ballots

than in those utilizing the nonpartisan or merit retention
ballot forms."

The partisan election system consists of a

ballot which contains information about the party
affiliation

of candidates.

As a result of the low saliency

of judicial elections as well as judicial candidates,

"the

candidates’ partisan affiliation is the single most
important voting cue in state judicial elections.

Moreover,

it is clear that if the office being contested is less
important to the voter and the candidates competing for such
low-salience offices are less familiar and the issues less
visible,

the voter will rely less upon short-term

considerations of particular candidates and issues and more
upon long-term psychological attachment to a political
party"

(Cowart 1973, 835).

A voting cue is removed when the nonpartisan election
system is utilized.

As a result,

the nonpartisan ballot
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tends to discourage voter participation.
employing the nonpartisan ballot,

In states

the political parties play

no formal role in the nomination and recruitment of judicial
candidates.

Whereas some voters may complete their ballots

because they recognize a familiar name or the name of an
incumbent, other voters may not participate in the judicial
elections because they do not perceive any recognizable
differences among the judicial candidates.
Like the nonpartisan election system,
retention ballot

lacks the party label.

the merit

In addition to

lacking the cue of political party absent from the
nonpartisan ballot, voters in the merit retention states
also lack a choice between competing candidates
1980, 48).

(Dubois

The reason for this is that the candidates of

the merit retention ballot are uncontested.

The merit

retention ballot requires voters to cast either a "yes" or
"no" vote.

Consequently,

"once in the polling booth, many

voters may fail to mark the retention ballot believing that
their votes will have little impact upon the final result"
(Dubois 1980, 49).
An election system which has not attracted much
scholarly attention is the mixed partisan nomination—
nonpartisan election system.
system,

judicial candidates are nominated by the political

parties, however,
ballot.

In this type of election

the party

According to Dubois

label is excluded from the
(1980, 72),

"with the low
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visibility and attention attached to supreme court contests
generally,

it is not

likely that the party cue in these

states which use the system of partisan nomination but
nonpartisan election, hereinafter called "mixed" states,

is

as strong as it is in those partisan states where party is
clearly labeled on the general election ballot."

Despite

this observation, unlike the nonpartisan nomination and
election system,

the mixed system is more likely to result

in voters completing the judicial ballot or a decrease in
rolloff,

since some voters are able to make a connection

between judicial candidates and their partisan affiliations
as a result of the partisan nomination process.
Dubois

(1980, 244) distinguished between the impact of

election systems on voter participation by concluding as
follows:

First, partisan judicial elections are
more frequently contested than non
partisan elections or, of course, the
uncontested merit retention ballotings....
The second distinction between
partisan and nonpartisan merit retention
ballots which accounts for variations in
the level of voter participation is the
presence of a meaningful voter cue on
the former and its absence on the
latter.

In other words,

the partisan ballot provides the voter with

a voting cue, political party affiliation.

It is this

voting cue which aids voters in their attempts to
differentiate between opposing

judicial candidates whom they
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know nothing or very little about.

For this reason, the

partisan ballot increases voter participation in judicial
races, whereas the nonpartisan ballot depresses voter
participation.

Ballot Format
Three types of ballot formats have been examined to
explain variations

in voter turnout in state judicial

elections.

(1966) discussed these three formats

Walker

when

determining the relationship between ballot forms and voter
fatigue.

According to the

are:

party column or Indiana, (2) office

(1)

Massachusetts, and
Dubois (1980)
According

author,

the three ballot

formats

block or

(3) Pennsylvania ballots.
provided a description of each format.

to Dubois (1980,

53-54),

the party column ballot lists the
candidates of each party for all offices
in a single column or row.
The
alternative ballot form, the office
block ballot, groups candidates of both
major parties by the office which is
being contested.
A third basic ballot
format called the Pennsylvania ballot,
is in actuality a hybrid of the two
major ballot forms.
Voters using a
Pennsylvania-type ballot face the
typical office block format, but at the
same time a party circle or lever is
available for those voters who choose to
cast a straight party ballot.

In short, this ballot allows for split-ticket voting as well
as voting a straight party ticket.
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Voter turnout is expected to be greatest in states
utilizing the party column ballot and the least in states
utilizing the office block ballot.

Thus,

the partisan

judicial ballot encourages voters to participate in the
selection of their supreme court justices (judges),
particularly when the ballot is equipped with a device which
allows the voters to make all of their electoral choices in
a single motion (Dubois 1980, 58).
Another

issue involved in determining the impact of

ballot format on voter turnout is rolloff.

Rolloff occurs

when voters vote for offices at the top of the ballot, but
do not vote for lower offices.
451),

According to Walker

"the amount of rolloff is greater

(1966,

in state utilizing

the office block ballot than in states utilizing the party
column ballot format."

This finding may be attributed to

voter fatigue, voters using political parties as voting
cues,

the saliency of offices at the top of the ballot when

compared to judicial races, and the convenience of pulling
one lever when the party column ballot is used.
Dubois

Similarly,

(1980, 53) contended that:
the office block ballot might contribute
to voter fatigue because it requires the
voter to express a number of individual
choices along a lengthy ballot.
For
races well down on the ballot and for
public measures being decided about
which the average voters have not
informed themselves, the voter may
become frustrated and simply fail to
complete the ballot.
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C o m p e t 1 1 iveness
Campbell et al.

(1960) contended that the perceived

closeness of an election heightens voter interest thus
stimulating voter turnout.

The impact of competitiveness of

judicial elections on voter turnout may be based on the
theoretical premises of the rational-actor model of Downs
(1957) and Riker and O i d e r s h o o k ’s (1968) calculus of voting.
The theory here is that voters are more likely to vote in
what they perceive to be a close or competitive election
because they believe their votes are likely to affect the
outcome of the election.
Scholars have found aggregate level support for the
"competitive threat theory"

(Key 1949; Gray 1976).

Researchers have also shown that intei— party competition is
associated with higher rates of voting
1964).Howeverj recent
of the

(Dye 1966; Jones

studies have questioned the accuracy

proposition that inter— party competition affects

voter turnout.

In fact,

it has been argued that "the

contribution of the degree of interparty competition to
turnout may be relatively minor,

if not wholly illusory,

when the effects of socioeconomic,
regional variables
(Blank

legal, political,

and

upon participation are first considered"

1974, 732). Even Gray

(1976) questioned

the validity

of the "competitive threat theory" over time.
Cox

(1988) went one step further

in his argument by

contending that the technique which has been utilized to
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measure the closeness of election— the percent of the vote
received by the winner minus the percent of the vote
received by the runnei— u p — results in a spurious correlation
with turnout.

The author presented an alternative measure

of closeness or the competitiveness of electoral contests.
He contended that the raw vote margin is a better measure of
closeness than the percentage margin.

He did find one

difficulty with using the raw vote margin.

One drawback

in

employing the raw vote margin is that "when it becomes very
large,

it must necessarily have a positive relationship with

turnout, as explained earlier;

thus, one must

square which eats up a degree of freedom"
Hannah

(1972) and Dubois

include its

(Cox 1988, 774).

(1980) considered the impact

of competitiveness on voter turnout in state judicial
elections.

Hannah did not find any significant differences

in turnout in Michigan's supreme court races when
considering the impact of the competitiveness of these
elections.

Similarly, Dubois found that competitive

judicial races did not increase voter turnout
supreme court races.

in Wisconsin

Instead Dubois found that

competitiveness had its greatest influence on presidential
primaries which encouraged voters to participate.
words,

In other

the competitiveness of the race at the top of the

ballot had a greater impact on electoral participation than
did competitive judicial races.

It was found that salient

races which attract public attention may pull voters to the
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polls who then incidentally vote for judicial candidates
(Dubois 1980, 42).

Impact of Candidate Variables
Gender of Candidate
Only one scholar has attempted to explain variations in
electoral participation in state judicial elections in terms
of the gender of the candidates.

Dubois (1984)

as a voting cue in judicial elections.

included sex

The author found

that electoral participation did not deviate from its usual
level

in state judicial elections when female candidates

were on the ballot.

Unlike the race of the candidates,

campaign expenditures, election systems, elections
scheduling, and other factors previous research revealed as
having

impacts on voter turnout in judicial elections,

the

gender of judicial candidates was not found to stimulate or
encourage electoral participation.

Race of Candidate
Judicial election research

is almost void of any type

of research which focuses upon the relationship between the
race of judicial candidates and electoral participation.
Collins

(1980, 334) found that "the appearance of a black

candidate in nonpartisan at-large races does net act to
stimulate comparatively higher
black precincts."

levels of turnout among the

The only exception Collins found was in

the lower category of social class.

According to Collins
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(1980, 334), "race appears to be a salient factor only in
accounting for turnout differences in the lower category of
social class."

In other words, voter turnout among lower

income black voters tends to increase when a black candidate
sought

judicial office.

This finding may be explained by citing the work of
Shingles

(1981).

Shingles found evidence which suggest that

blacks of lower socioeconomic status vote at a higher rate
than similarly situated whites.

He attributes this

difference in turnout between blacks and whites to a sense
of black consciousness.

According to Shingles

(1981, 76),

"the primary reason black consciousness has such a dramatic
effect on political participation is that it contributes to
the combination of a sense of political efficacy and
political mistrust which in turn induces political
involvement."

The line of argument presented by Shingles is

that lower income blacks vote because they do not trust
government and feel
government.

it is their duty to help change

In other words,

the act of voting provides

lower income blacks with a feeling of political efficacy and
expressive benefits.
A shortcoming of researchers who have focused on the
impact of the race of judicial candidates on voter turnout
in state judicial elections is that their primary focus has
been black voter turnout
Alozie 1988).

(Collins 1980; Atkins et al. 1984;

Instead of analyzing whether the presence of
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a black judicial candidate on the ballot
participation in the total population»

increases electoral

these scholars have

focused their attentions only on black voter turnout,
ignoring the larger question:

thus

does the race of judicial

candidates have an impact on electoral participation in
state judicial elections?
greater

In other words,

is voter turnout

in contests involving black and white candidates as

opposed to electoral contests in which the candidates are of
the same race or do white and black voters vote at higher
rates when white judicial

candidates compete against black

candidates?
Atkins et al.
(1980)

(1984) went one step further than Collins

when comparing differences in turnout based on the

race of candidates by matching constituents according to
their age, education, and nonprofessional occupational
status.

However,

like Collins,

the authors analyzed whether

black candidates were influential

in drawing black voters to

the polls in state judicial elections.

The data suggested

that "voters in predominantly black precincts participated
in substantially higher proportions in the race with a black
candidate than they did in other races for the Supreme
C o u r t " (Atkins et al.
candidate’s racial

1984, 211).

They found that a

identity did in fact affect voter turnout

in judicial elections.

The authors concluded that the

presence of black candidates, when socioeconomic variables
are controlled for, does increase black voter turnout.
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Campaign Spending
Scholars who have analyzed the role of campaign
spending in American elections have found that the cost of
financing campaigns is directly related to constituency size
(Heard I960; Adamany 1972; Owens 1973).

The cost of

informing voters is expected to increase as the size of the
constituency increases.

The cost of mailing campaign

literature rises in direct proportion to the number of
voters who have to be reached

(Dubois 1986, 273).

Additionally, campaign finance literature suggests that
the presence of an incumbent
campaign expenditures
Jacobson 1980).

in a race will

(Heard 1960; Adamany

increase
1972; Owens 1973;

The reason for this finding is that

incumbents attract contributions and challengers must raise
and spend large sums of money in an attempt to overcome the
incumbent’s advantage of name familiarity and prior
e x perience.
A final factor which has been considered by scholars is
the degree of electoral competition on election costs
(Adamany 1972; Owens 1973).

Competitive races have been

found to cost more than noncompetitive races.

The

candidates involved in competitive races are more likely to
raise and spend large sums of money in an attempt to
increase their electabi1i t y .
To test the hypothesis that competitive elections
stimulate campaign expenditures,

Cox and Hunger

(1989)

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

48

examined the 1982 United States House elections.

The

authors based their hypothesis on the works of Caldeira and
Patterson (1982) and Patterson and Caldeira

(1983)

in which

these scholars found evidence which revealed a positive
correlation between total campaign spending and voter
turnout.

Cox and Munger provided three reasons to explain

how competitive races might result in greater expenditures.
The authors stated as follows;
First, instrumentally motivated
contributors might give more in close
elections (because their contributions
have a greater chance of affecting the
outcome), thereby allowing candidates to
spend more.
Second, even if no
contributors are instrumental and all
seek "access" or a specific favor (See
Denzau and Munger 1986; Ferejohn and
Noll 1985), one might still expect an
increase in contributions in closer
races....
Third, because candidates
value a given amount of money more
highly in closer races, they will be
more willing to borrow, to use their own
financial resources, and to incur debts
that they may not be able to pay.
All
of these financial practices allow
greater campaign cost in closer contests
(Cox and Munger 1989, 219).

Cox and Munger's explanations support the proposition that
competitive races might stimulate campaign expenditures.
Candidates are more likely to seek financial support when
their chances of winning public office is greatest.
Candidates perceive their electabi1ity as being greatest
close contests.
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The authors also examined whether expenditures affect
voter turnout.

They found that races* involving high

expenditures were more likely to draw voters to the polls
than the closeness of the elections.
Munger

(1989, 226),

According to Cox and

"closeness exerts its predominant effect

only on participation inside the booth (i.e., rolloff)."
Dubois (1986) argued that there are three aspects of
the role of money in financing judicial elections.

The

first factor is the belief that the cost of financing
judicial campaigns may place limitations on competition.
According to Dubois (1986, 265),
such reports naturally limit electoral
competition by discouraging prospective
candidates even if campaign finance
levels have not in fact escalated
sharply.
Another aspect of the role of
money that has drawn recent attention
has been the reported heavy reliance
upon lawyers for the contributions
required to finance judicial campaigns.

This particular aspect is believed to result in a conflict
of interest for judges.

The final aspect is that the amount

of campaign spending may influence the electoral success of
judicial candidates.

Incumbencv or Prior Judicial Experience
A considerable amount of research has been conducted on
incumbency advantage in congressional elections

(Erikson

1971; Mayhew 1974; Abramowitz 1975; Cover 1977; Parker

1980;

Collie 1981; Jacobson 1981; Hibbing and Alford 1981; Garand
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and Gross 1984) and other elections (Caldeira and Patterson
1982; Patterson and Caldeira 1983; Beyle 1983; Jewell and
Breaux

1988).

For example, Mayhew

(1974) argued that

incumbents have an information advantage.

According to the

author, changes in the number of competitive seats in
congressional districts may be the result of an increase in
the electoral advantage of incumbents.

Mayhew (1974, 317)

concluded that "incumbency does seem to have increased in
electoral value, and

it is reasonable to suppose that one

effect of this increase has been to boost House members of
both parties out of the marginal electoral range."
also emphasized the growth
for incumbents.

Mayhew

in the availability of resources

Other examples of explanations advanced to

explain the increased electoral advantage of incumbents are
the works of Erikson (1971),
Alford

(1981)

(1977), and Hibbing and

in which these scholars emphasized changes in

the electorate.
(1981)

Cover

Finally, Abramowitz

(1975) and Jacobson

focused on the importance of weak opponents in

congressional elections.
Recent studies focusing on incumbency in congressional
elections have resulted

in conflicting findings (Jacobson

1987; Bauer and Hibbing 1989).

Jacobson (1987) concluded

that competition in congressional races involving incumbent
House members has not declined.

Instead he found that

incumbent House members must still face competition and that
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their margins of victory as well as their success in their
bids for reelection have declined over time.
On the other hand, Bauer and Hibbing
concluded that:

<1989, 262)

"(1) there has been no meaningful

increase

in the chances of big winners subsequently losing and
recent elections the chances of scandal-free,

(2) in

unredis

tricted, previously safe incumbent losing are practically
null."

These authors contended that a decline in the margin

of victory of incumbent House members is a function of
whether they were involved in any type of scandal which may
have an impact on public opinion and their success in being
reelected.

Another factor considered by these authors was a

change in the composition of the electorate within
previously safe districts as a result of the redrawing of
district

lines.

Dubois (1980) discussed merit retention elections and
incumbency.

According to the author, few judges have ever

lost during such elections.

Merit retention elections

require voters to vote "yes"

in order for previously

appointed
"no"

judicial candidates to remain on the bench and

if they want to remove an appointed candidate from the

bench.

The merit system of selecting judges consist of an

appointment process followed by a performance review of the
judge by the electorate during merit retention elections.
Dubois <1980,

19) concluded that "voters find it difficult
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to vote against someone without a reasonable alternative
candidate to vote for."
Despite Dubois’ observations,

the relationship between

incumbency and electoral participation in contested
nonpartisan state judicial elections has not been explained.
As a result, judicial research is void of an examination of
the impact of incumbency on voter turnout in such elections.
The question which remains unanswered is:

does the presence

of an incumbent in contested nonpartisan state judicial
elections stimulate or depress electoral participation?

Impact of Sociodemographic Variables
Sociodemographic variables have never been considered
as factors which may affect electoral participation in
contested nonpartisan state judicial elections.
variables as the age, educational attainment,

Such

income level,

occupation, the race of the electorate, and voting age
population residing in rural areas are included in this
analysis in an attempt to determine to what extent electoral
participation in state judicial elections is influenced by
the same type of factors that account for participation in
other elections (e.g., presidential, congressional,
gubernatorial).

In other words, an examination of these

variables will allow a determination of whether

judicial

election participation is a function of the same or
different variables that affect voter turnout in other
races.
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The inclusion of specific sociodemographic variables is
based on the work of Wolfinger and Rosenstone <1980).

A

very strong relationship was found between rates of voting
and years of education.

Individuals with higher levels of

education were found to vote more often than those with less
education.

Wolfinger and Rosenstone

(1980, 42) found that

"only thirty-eight percent of the respondents with fewer
than five years of schooling went to the polls, as compared
with sixty-nine percent of those with a high school diploma,
and eighty-six percent of those who were college graduates
and ninety-one percent of the people with at least a year in
graduate school."
The authors provided two reasons to explain the effects
of education on voter turnout.

The first explanation had to

do with social norms and a sense of civic duty.

They

contended that better educated individuals were more likely
to possess these qualities.

Secondly, educated persons were

better able to inform themselves about politics and to
understand the issues involved in political campaigns.

The

authors concluded that education was the most important
socioeconomic variable in explaining voter turnout.
The researchers also found a strong relationship
between income and turnout when controlling for the effects
of education.

They found evidence which suggest that

turnout increased with income.

Wolfinger and Rosenstone

(1980) provided at least four explanations to explain the
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relationship between income and voter turnout.

First, poor

people are believed to vote at a considerably lower rate
than "well-to-do" people because the poor are preoccupied
with fulfilling their biological needs.

According to

M a s l o w ’s (1981) hierarchy of needs, biological or
physiological needs (e.g., food, water, sleep,
the most

important and basic of all needs.

shelter) are

He contended

that individuals are driven by a desire to fulfill their
biological or physiological needs.

Individuals who are

preoccupied with meeting these daily needs have neither the
energy nor the desire to participate in political activities
(including voting)

(Maslow 1981, 26).

Second, higher incomes allow individuals to live in
better neighborhoods and to be exposed to various norms,
pressures, and socializations which may encourage political
participation— voting.

Third, people with higher

incomes

are more confident and possess a keener sense of civic duty,
thus are more likely to vote than poor people.

Finally,

rich people have more to lose as a result of governmental
policies,

therefore they are more likely to participate in

the political process in an attempt to promote and protect
their interests (Frey 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found that increased
job status increased the probability of voting.

Their

results indicated that white-collar workers (professional
and technical; farmers,

managers,

administrators;

and clerks
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and salespeople) voted at higher rates <86 percent, 76
percent and 75 percent respectively)
workers

(skilled workers,

than blue-collar

64 percent; nondomestic service

workers, 63 percent; unskilled and semiskilled workers, 53
percent;

and farm laborers and foremen, 46 percent).

The

authors explained their findings by suggesting that some
jobs bring people into contact with issues involving
politics,

thus resulting

in greater electoral participation.

An exception to this is that farmers fluctuate in their
electoral participation.

To account for this fluctuation,

Wolfinger and Rosenstone discussed the changing economic
fortunes of farmers which result from government actions or
policies and variations in the relationship between farmers
and government.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found

in their analysis

of the 1972 presidential election that blacks voted at a
slightly higher rate than whites.

The impact of the

variable race was highest among less educated blacks.

The

author found a four percent higher probability of voting
among blacks who had not attended college.
work of Shingles

Once again,

(1981) may be used to explain the

relationship between race and voter turnout,

particularly

among lower class blacks.
An inclusion of the variable race is very important
particularly in light of the findings of Abramson and
Claggett

the

(1989) which differ from those of Wolfinger and

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

56

Rosenstone (1980)

and Shingles

(1981).

Abramson and

Claggett contended that there are very little,

if any,

differences in voting between whites and blacks.

They

argued that any difference which may be indicated is the
result of the tendency of blacks to overreport their
electoral participation.
The variable white registered voters has also been
included in this analysis, since Wolfinger and Rosenstone
(1980) found evidence which suggest that white voters were
more likely to vote when other demographic factors are
controlled for.
Finally, age was found to be the second most important
variable in explaining voter turnout.

People were found to

vote at higher rates as they assumed "adult roles."
According to Milbrath and Goel

(1977), participation

increases steadily with age until

it reaches a peak in the

middle years and then gradually declines with old age.
People between the ages of 39 and 69 were more likely to
vote than the youngest adults.

The explanation Wolfinger

and Rosenstone (1980) provided for this finding is that
people have more at stake politically later in life than
when they are younger.
scholars,

For example, according to these

individuals with families, homes,

and full-time

employment were more likely to participate than younger
individuals with less at stake.
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Also related to the relationship between age and
willingness to vote is the fact that younger voters or those
younger than the age of 39 are more likely to move or
relocate than older voters (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger
and Rosenstone 1980; Squire et al.

1987).

Squire et al.

(1987) examined the impact mobilization may have on voter
turnout.

According to Squire et al.

(1987, 45),

low voter turnout among young voters may
be the result of changes in residences
and the requirement that people must
register before voting.
(Additionally),
residential mobility has a substantial
impact on national voter turnout rates,
since nearly one-third of the nation
moves ever two years.

An additional variable which has been included as a
demographic factor which may influence electoral
participation in judicial elections is the percentage of the
voting age population residing in rural areas.
variable is included

This

in order to account for the expected

differences in voter turnout between people residing in
rural and urbanized areas.
(1960), and Blank

Key (1949), Campbell et al.

(1974) found a difference in voter turnout

in rural areas and turnout in urban areas.

According to

these researchers, because of the smaller size of rural
areas, elections were found to be more salient,

thus

accounting for more electoral participation in these areas.
They found that people residing in urbanized areas vote at a
lower rate than those residing in rural areas because of the
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presence of "big government"

in urbanized areas.

Politics

and elections in general are viewed as being more personal
to individuals living
living in urban areas.
participating

in rural areas as opposed to those
Furthermore,

candidates

in elections in urban areas must spend more to

inform the public than those in rural areas of the state
(Blank 1974).

Summary
Of the factors which have been found to have an impact
on electoral participation in state judicial elections,

the

gender of judicial candidates is viewed as having little,
any,

influence on voter turnout in judicial contests.

if

A

second variable which previous research reveal as having a
slight effect on judicial races is the competitiveness of
the elections.

There are conflicting findings on the

relationship between the race of judicial candidates and
voter turnout.

Additionally,

judicial

literature is void of

examinations on the impact of incumbency on variations in
voter turnout

in judicial elections.

In order to determine

whether such a relationship exists, more research is
required.

The remaining variables— election scheduling,

election systems, ballot formats, and campaign expenditures-have been found to influence voter turnout in state
judicial elections.
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Chapter Three
Data and Methodology

The Louisiana judicial election system has been chosen
as the focal point for this research because data on these
elections were readily available and allowed the incorpora
tion of the previously discussed factors as well as other
relevant variables in a comprehensive model of voter turnout
in state judicial elections.
(1988)

and Engstrom

(1988)

The data provided by Weber

in their examinations of the

judicial election system of Louisiana have been employed
this research.

Weber

number of candidates,
candidates,

and Engstrom compiled

in

data on the

the campaign spending of some

the race of each candidate, and the number of

votes received by each

judicial candidate.

Weber

(1988, 2)

devised a database in his examination of Louisiana’s
judicial election processes which is unique, since "no other
individual or groups had previously constructed a database
of L o u isiana’s judicial election results for the
contemporary time period."
This aggregate-level
contested nonpartisan

analysis includes

a total of 94

District and Family court and

13 Court

of Appeals elections which took place in the State of
Louisiana from 1981 to 1988.

The years 1981 through 1988

were selected because campaign finance data recorded during
this period were found to be more accurate than data

59
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recorded prior to this time.

Prior to 1981,

it is difficult

to accurately determine total campaign expenditures in
Louisiana elections.

After 1980, there was a change in the

forms Louisiana candidates used to report their campaign
expenditures,

thus making it easier to accurately determine

the amount of money spent by each candidate.
The present study is unique, since it represents the
first attempt to include and analyze the impact of
incumbency, campaign spending,

the race of judicial

candidates, and socioeconomic factors on voter turnout
within the same analysis.

In other words,

the present study

includes an analysis of the impact contextual, candidate
attributes, and demographic variables may have on voter
turnout in these elections.

Appendix Two contains a

description of each variable as well as the manner in which
each variable has been operationalized.
Finally,

this research differs from other research

because it focuses on Louisiana district and state
intermediate appellate court elections.

Scholars who have

conducted studies on judicial elections have chosen for one
reason or another to exclude Louisiana from their analyses
or have concerned themselves with state supreme court
elections (Vines and Jacob

1962; Hannah

Adamany and Dubois 1976; Dubois 1979,

1972; Atkins 1976;

1980).

The major

reason may have been a problem with the availability of data
on Louisiana judicial election prior to the 1980s.
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The units of analysis for this dissertation are the
elections themselves.

The primary independent variables—

incumbency or prior judicial experience,

race of the

candidate, campaign expenditure, the holding of previous
elective office, type of election (primary or general), and
sociodemographic characteristics (age,

income, education,

percentage of white registered voters, percentage of the
total population residing in rural areas, and occupation)—
are analyzed to determine their impact on electoral
participation in Louisia na’s judicial elections.

The other

variables which have been examined in previous works and
discussed in Chapter Two are controlled for in this
research.

The manner

in which the primary and control

variables are operationalized is discussed in later sections
of this chapter.
An examination of the variables included in this study
should provide results which answer the following question:
What is the precise relationship between contextual
variables, candidate characteristic variables, and
sociodemographic factors on electoral participation in
contested nonpartisan judicial elections in the State of
Louisiana from 1981 to 1988 when other factors are
controlled for?

In other words,

this research examines

which factors provide the best explanation for variations in
voter turnout in Louisiana’s judicial elections.
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Measuring Voter Turnout
Previous studies have measured voter turnout as the
number of individuals casting valid ballots in each election
as a proportion of the voting age population (Campbell et
al.

I960; Gray 1976; Kim et al.

turnout

1975).

Therefore voter

in judicial elections is calculated as follows:

# of valid ballots cast in judicial elections
total voting age population

X 100

This estimate of turnout should allow a determination of the
age eligible voters who actually cast ballots in judicial
elections.
Population statistics of Louisiana parishes were
obtained from the Louisiana Secretary of State Office.

The

total voting age population was determined by relying upon
material from the Louisiana Secretary of State Office as
well as the 1980 and 1990 census counts.

The U.S. Bureau of

C e n s u s ’ classification for the age range 18 and older was
relied upon to measure total voting age population.
Information from the Louisiana Secretary of State Office was
employed to control for the impact prison and military
populations located in certain parishes may have had on
inflating voting age population.

The method of measurement

utilized to extrapolate voting age population over a seven
year period

(1981-1988)

is as follows;

TVAP = TVAP(1990) - TVAP (1980) = RESULT / TVAP (1980)
= RESULT / 10 (represents year range, 1990-1980)
= RESULT * TVAP (n) = RESULT + TVAP (1980)
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Where n = election year, e.g.,
1982, 3 = 1983, etc.

In addition to measuring overall
elections, Dubois

(1979) also measured

supreme court elections.

1 = 1981, 2 =

turnout in judicial
"rolloff"

in state

Rolloff occurs when voters

participate in "major partisan offices" at the top of the
ballot but fail

to cast ballots in the judicial elections.

The "major partisan race"

is defined as the presidential,

gubernatorial, or United States senatorial contest which
attracted the most voters in each election year"
1979, 871).

In other words,

(Dubois

voters are more likely to

participate in more salient races at the top of ballot.
rationale for this finding

is twofold.

First,

The

voters may

perceive the major office at the top of the ballot as
directly affecting their everyday lives.

For example,

voters may participate in such elections because the issues-taxation or foreign policy— involved
affect them in some way.

Second,

in such contests

the issues in the major

partisan races are more clear cut than those in judicial
races

(Kenney 1983).
The present study does not measure rolloff.

The reason

being that rolloff has customarily been measured to
determine the impact ballot format may have on voter
turnout.

However, Louisiana has exclusively utilized the

office-block election ballot during the time period included
in this analysis.

For this reason,

it is not necessary to
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measure rolloff in this analysis.

Researchers have

demonstrated that rolloff does occur

in judicial elections,

therefore the present study focuses solely on the factors
which may account for variations in voter turnout in
judicial elections.

The variable election scheduling is a

more appropriate variable for analysis purposes than ballot
format.

The inclusion of the variable election scheduling

will measure and capture the effect concurrent presidential,
congressional, or gubernatorial elections may have on
electoral participation in state judicial elections.
variable election scheduling will be discussed

The

in the next

section.

Measurement of Variables in Contextual Model
Election Scheduling
Judicial research scholars have employed the "surge and
decline" theory of Angus Campbell
variations in voter turnout.
Dubois

(1966)

Hannah

to explain

(1972)

and Adamany and

(1976) followed Campbell’s example when examining

voter turnout in state supreme court elections.

The

election scheduling theory rests on the assumption that
voter turnout in state judicial elections will be highest at
presidential general elections, followed by congressional
election dates, and high visibility state and local
elections

(gubernatorial and mayoral) held during off-years.

This theory of voter turnout suggests the following
hypotheses :
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H,:

With all else being equal, state judicial
elections held concurrently with presidential
general elections will have the highest
turnout.

HE:

With all else being equal, state judicial
elections held concurrently with mid-term
congressional elections will have moderate
levels of voter turnout.

Ha :

State judicial elections held concurrently
with high visibility state and local races,
ceteris paribus, will have the lowest levels
of voter turnout.

The theoretical basis for the above hypotheses rests on the
work of Adamany and Dubois (1976) and their reference to the
work of Campbell

(1966).

According to Adamany and Dubois

(1976, 743),

the surge and decline theory may also
have meaning for concurrent and
nonconcurrent state supreme court
elections.
Core voters may dominate
nonconcurrent judicial elections.
In
concurrent supreme court races
peripheral voters join the judicial
electorate, drawn to the polls by the
presidential primary or perhaps by
significant referenda.

The rationale underlying the above hypotheses as well
as the work of Adamany and Dubois is that there will be a
surge in voter participation in judicial elections held
during presidential and congressional election years because
such salient races attract core voters as well as peripheral
voters.

However,

judicial elections which occur during off-

years or at special elections are dominated by the
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participation of core voters.

This accounts for the decline

in voter participation during off-years.
Judicial election scheduling is captured by the
inclusion of a series of dummy variables.

Judicial races

which occurred during a presidential year are coded "1" and
those which did not occur during a presidential general
election are scored "0".

Elections which occurred during

congressional elections are scored "1", those occurring
during noncongressional elections are coded "0".

Judicial

elections scheduled during a high visibility election (e.g.,
mayoral or gubernatorial race) are scored

"1", and "0"

otherwise.

Election Svstems
The variable election systems cannot be theoretically
nor empirically

included in the present analysis, even

though Louisiana is a unique case, with the party
affiliation of judicial candidates printed on the ballot
nonpartisan races.

in

It is necessary to exclude the variable

election systems because there is no available data from the
State of Louisiana which would allow for comparisons among
the different types of election systems

(nonpartisan,

partisan, mixed, and merit retention).

Louisiana has relied

exclusively upon the nonpartisan election system.
result,

As a

it is impossible to determine whether election

systems have had an impact on voter turnout in Louisiana’s
judicial elections.
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Additionally, even the inclusion of a variable scoring
party identification (Democrat or Republican) will add
little or nothing to this analysis,

since the manner in

which state trial and intermediate appellate court elections
are conducted or the diminished importance of political
parties in such elections is different from other elections
( e.g., presidential, gubernatorial, mayoral, or
senatorial).

Judicial candidates must adhere to the

American Bar Association’s Code of Judicial C o n d u c t .

This

Code places restraints on the behaviors of judicial
candidates and prevents them from expressing their opinions
on public policy issues.
According to Dubois

(1980, 66),

if judicial candidates compete on
partisan ballots, they are permitted by
the Code to acknowledge a connection
with a political party, but the campaign
necessarily must remain formally
nonprogrammatic.
And in states
utilizing the nonpartisan nomination and
election method of selection, state law
usually prohibits political party
organizations from offering endorsements
to candidates and from engaging in
direct or indirect campaign activity on
behalf of a (judicial) candidate.

In other words, even though the party identifications of
candidates are printed on the election ballot,

state

judicial candidates are not viewed as having or embracing a
party platform,

therefore,

the influence of party

affiliation is probably negligible.

Following the same line
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of argument,

the party affiliation of state judicial

candidates has not been found to bring voters to the polls
or increase voter turnout

(Dubois 1980).

On the other hand

this variable has an impact when serving as a voting cue for
voters once they have decided to participate in the election
(Dubo is 1984) .
Finally,

states like Louisiana have traditionally been

dominated by one of the two major political parties.
this reason,

For

limited competition between the Democrat and

Republican parties result

in party affiliation playing an

insignificant role in drawing voters to the polls.

Instead

partisanship is expected to serve as a voting cue which
affect the outcome of elections rather than a catalyst which
draws voters to the polls.

Ballot Format
The variable ballot format has been excluded from this
analysis because Louisiana has exclusively utilized the
office block or Massachusetts ballot.

This ballot groups

candidates according to the office being contested,
regardless of their party identifications.

Louisiana’s

reliance upon one specific type of ballot for many years
prevents a determination of the impact different ballot
formats might have on electoral participation in judicial
elections, particularly during the time period under
consideration in the present analysis.
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Competitiveness
Previous studies of the relationship between
competitiveness and voter turnout in state judicial
elections have suggested findings which add little or
nothing to the explanatory power of voter turnout models of
judicial elections (Hannah 1972; Dubois 1980).
findings of these researchers,

Despite the

the variable competitiveness

has been included in this study.

The basic argument with

regards to this variable is that judicial contests,
specifically those which occur in rural areas, are more
likely to be competitive races.

The rationale underlying

this contention is that voters are more familiar with the
names as well as policy concerns of judicial candidates as a
result of the size of rural districts.

In most rural areas,

particularly those in Louisiana, everyone knows everyone.
As a result,

the few lawyers in such areas are well-known,

and people view the electoral success of judicial candidates
as a form of personal politics.

Additionally,

a preliminary

run of the data revealed that voter turnout was higher in
elections held in districts located in rural areas as
opposed to those elections held in urban judicial districts.
For this reason, competitiveness has been included in this
analysis.
The competitive theory of electoral turnout in judicial
elections is based on the following hypothesis;
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H*;

Ceteris p a r i b u s , electoral participation is
expected to be greatest in competitive
contests.

Competition is measured according to the traditional
method

(Key 1949; Gray 1976; Hannah 1972) as the total votes

received by the winner minus the total votes received by the
runner-up as a proportion of the total votes cast
election.

In other words,

in each

competition is measured as

f o 1lows :

COMPETITION = total winner votes — total runner—up votes
total votes cast

The lower the percentage which results when using this
method,

the more competitive the judicial election.

Type of Election
A variable which judicial scholars has not considered
in their research is type of election— general
Hannah

(1972), Dubois and Adamany

and primary.

(1976), and Dubois

(1980)

have examined the impact election scheduling may have on
voter turnout, but these scholars have not included the
impact type of election may have on electoral participation
in judicial contests.
Existing literature on presidential and congressional
races have suggested that whether an election is a primary
or general election has an impact on voter turnout
1949; Boyd 1989; Wright 1989).

(Key

These researchers have found

conflicting findings on the impact the type of election may
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have on voter turnout.
greater

Key concluded that turnout is

in general elections rather than primary elections.

According to Key, the electorate that participates in
primary elections is different from the electorate that
participates in general elections.

Key referred to the

former voters as "core" voters and the latter as
"peripheral" voters.

Core voters possess a high

level of

interest in politics or issues and are more likely to
participate in the electoral process.

On the other hand,

peripheral voters are drawn to the polls by popular races
such as presidential general elections.
In contrast to K e y ’s findings are the findings of Boyd
(1989) and Wright

(1989).

In their respective works,

concluded that electoral participation is higher

they

in primary

elections rather than runoff primaries and general
elections.

Unlike K e y ’s core and peripheral voter theory,

Boyd and Wright argue that the electorate is more likely to
participate in the first election— primary election, rather
than the second election— runoff primary or general
election.
Despite the findings of Boyd
the work of Key

(1949)

(1989) and Wright

(1989),

serves as the theoretical basis for

the hypotheses contained

in this section.

The following

hypotheses are contained

in the type of election theory of

voter turnout in state judicial elections:
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Hg :

Ceteris p a r i b u s , electoral participation will
be greater in general elections.

H*:

Ceteris p a r i b u s » electoral participation will
decrease in primary elections.

The variable type of election is scored
elections and "0" for primary elections.
variable has been operationalized

"1" for general

Even though the

in this manner,

the

statistical method employed indicates whether K e y ’s or Boyd
and W r i g h t ’s contentions are more accurate in explaining the
impact the type of election may have on voter turnout,
specifically in judicial races.

Measurement of Variables in Candidate Model
Gender
The gender of judicial candidates has not been found to
have a significant impact on voter turnout
Unfortunately,

(Dubois 1980).

the available data on Louisiana does not

contain an adequate number of contests in which women were
participants to permit a measure of the relationship between
gender and electoral participation.

Race
A race-based theory of voter turnout

in state judicial

elections has as its foundation the work of scholars who
have found evidence which suggest that the presence of a
black candidate in a judicial contest stimulates electoral
participation (Collins 1980; Atkins et al.

1984).

This

theory of voter turnout suggests the following hypotheses:
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H,:

With all else being equal, the presence of a
black judicial candidate on the ballot will
encourage black and overall' voter turnout.

H g:

The presence of a black candidate in a
judicial race, ceteris p aribus, will make the
contest more salient, thus increasing white
and overall voter turnout.

The theoretical basis for the above hypotheses rests on
the works of Collins (1980) and Atkins et al.

(1984).

These

authors found evidence which suggest that the presence of a
black political candidate does increase black voter turnout,
particularly among lower

income blacks.

This observed trend

in voter turnout among black voters of lower socioeconomic
status may be theoretically explained by the work of
Shingles

(1981).

According to Shingles, an increase in electoral
participation among lower

income blacks may be attributed to

black consciousness and a feeling of civic duty.
words,

In other

lower income blacks vote, particularly when a black

person seeks public office, because they mistrust government
and perceive their votes as promoting change and
accountability in government.

In a similar vein,

income blacks have high levels of political
voting— because they feel

lower

involvement—

it is their duty to vote,

especially after the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.
The work of Pitkin also provides an explanation for
increased black participation when black candidates seek
public office.

Pitkin

(1967) distinguished between two
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types of representation.

The first type is descriptive in

which voters vote for candidates who possess similar ethnic,
racial, or socioeconomic characteristics as themselves.

The

second type of representation is substantive in which voters
vote for public officials they feel have similar policy
concerns as themselves.

It is the former type of

representation which accounts for an increase in black voter
turnout when a black person seeks judicial office.
The independent variable race is measured
conventionally as a dichotomous dummy variable.
variable is scored

"1" for black

This

judicial candidates and "0"

for white candidates.

Campaign Spending
Of interest in this analysis is the overall voter
turnout in each election.

For this reason,

campaign spending of each election contest

the total
is included.

A theory of campaign spending to explain voter turnout
in state judicial elections is based on the works of Adamany
(1972) and Dubois (1986).

The following hypothesis is

suggested by such a theory:

H,:

An increase in campaign spending will
increase voter participation in judicial
elections, ceteris paribus.

The variable campaign spending

is calculated

in a

similar manner as the measurement used by Cox and Munger
(1989).

In order to control for the effects the size of a
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district may have on campaign spending, expenditure is
measured as total expenditure in each election as a
proportion of the d i s t r i c t ’s voting age population.
Campaign finance information was drawn from reports
filed by each judicial candidate with Louisiana Campaign
Finance Office.

Appendix Three contains a copy of the form

employed to record expenditure data on each
candidate.

judicial

Expenditure data was collected on more than 200

candidates who participated

in Louisiana trial and

intermediate appellate judicial elections from 1981 through
1988.

Incumbencv or Prior Judicial Experience
Judicial election studies are void of an examination of
the relationship between incumbency or prior judicial
experience and voter turnout in contested nonpartisan races.
As a result, an explanatory theory of incumbency must rely
upon the works of congressional scholars
Abramowitz

1975;

(Erikson 1971;

Alford and Hibbing 1981; Jacobson 1987;

Ansolabehere et al.

1988; Bauer and Hibbing

1989).

An incumbency-based theory of voter turnout in state
judicial elections suggests the following hypothesis:

H

With all else being equal, an election
involving an incumbent will stimulate voter
tu r n o u t .

Incumbency is measured as a dichotomous dummy variable
scored "1" for elections in which an incumbent or an
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individual with prior judicial experience was seeking
reelection and "0" for elections which did not involve an
incumbent.

Measuring incumbency in this manner differs from

studies which have scored incumbency as years of continuous
tenure in office (Patterson and Caldeira 1983).

Such a

measure of incumbency has been excluded from this analysis,
since using such a method would add little or nothing to the
explanatory power of electoral participation in state
judicial elections.

Prior

judicial experience has been

included for analysis purposes instead of incumbency in
order to allow for the inclusion of those judges who may
have been appointed as a result of a vacancy on the bench,
lost the special election,

yet were successfully in securing

judgeships in subsequent judicial contests.

Elective Office
The theory underlying this variable is that candidates
who have previously held elective office
Attorney,

(e.g.. District

counciIperson) will have an impact on voter

turnout in judicial elections.

The following hypothesis is

suggested by this theory:

H,,:

With all else being equal, elections
involving candidates who have previously held
elective office will increase voter turnout.

The variable elective office is scored "1" if the
candidate has held elective office, excluding a judgeship
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which is captured by the incumbency variable, and "0" if the
candidate has not held elective office.

Measurement of Variables in Sociodemographic Model
Sociodemooraohic Variables
A sociodemographic theory of voter turnout suggests the
following hypotheses:

H W i t h all else being equal, elections held in
districts with voters of high levels of
educational attainment are more likely to be
associated with high levels of voter turnout.
H,a:

With all else being equal, elections held in
districts with voters of high incomes should
be characterized with high levels of voter
t urnout.

H W i t h all else being equal, judicial elections
held in districts consisting of professionals
or white-collar workers should be associated
with high levels of voter turnout.
HjaZ

Elections held in districts with large
percentages of white voters are expected to
have high levels of electoral participation,
ceteris p a r i b u s .

H

With all being equal, elections held in
districts consisting of lower income blacks
should be characterized by high levels of
voter turnout.

H W i t h all else being equal, elections held in
districts located in rural areas should be
characterized by high levels of electoral
participation.
H|e:

Ceteris pa r i b u s , elections held in districts
consisting of voters ranging in age from 35
through 69 should be associated with high
levels of electoral participation.
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The rationale for the first five hypotheses is based on the
work of Wolfinger and Rosenstone

(1980).

The authors

describe and explain which personal characteristics
possessed by the electorate are most likely to encourage
them to vote in presidential general elections.

Wolfinger

and Rosenstone classified the electorate on the basis of
demographic characteristic

(age,

income, education,

occupation, sex, and race) and contextual variables

(state

voter registration laws, concurrent elections, political
cultures).
Despite the findings of Verba and Nie
and Rosenstone (1980), and Squire et al.
range 35 through 69 was examined

(1972), Wolfinger

(1987); the age

in this study because the

Census B u r e a u ’s classification of age is based upon four
year periods.

For example,

the categories for age as

classified by the U.S. Census Bureau are 30 to 34, 35 to 39,
40 to 44, etc.

Thirty-five through sixty-nine was selected

as the age group in the present study because selecting the
age range 40 to 69 would ignore the impact "Baby Boomers"
(those aged 35 to 40) may have on explaining variations in
electoral participation.
The variable rural has been included in this research
because the findings of Key
and Blank

(1949), Campbell et al.

(1960),

(1974) suggest that voter turnout should be higher

in elections held in rural areas rather than in those held
in urban areas.

To account for this difference in electoral
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participation in rural areas,

these scholars contend that

politics in rural areas is more personal because of the
absence of "Big Government."
The variable rural

is measured as the percentage of the

total population within each district that resides in rural
areas.

The definition of "rural" and the classification

relied upon to code this variable is based on information
from the United States Bureau of Census.
The other sociodemographic variables are operational
ized either as a percentage or a median representing the
overall characteristics of the electorate within the
parishes in which judicial elections occurred.

Family

income will be scored as median family income, education as
a percentage of high school graduates in each district, age
as the percentage of the population between the ages of 35
and 69, black

income as the median family income for blacks,

white collar workers as the percentage of workers in each
parish who are white collar workers.
of the variables white collar

The operationalization

is based upon the work of

Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980)

in which they classified

white collar workers as professional and technical workers
as well as farmers,
salespeople.

managers, administrators,

and clerks and

The variable black median family income has

been included to determine whether

lower income blacks are

more likely to vote.
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Finally» the percent of white registered voters in each
parish

is measured as a proportion of total registered

voters.

This method of measurement

is relied upon in order

to eliminate the problem which arises when attempting to
calculate white voting age population as a proportion of the
total voting age population.

The problem with utilizing the

latter method is that is difficult to accurately measure the
increase or decrease in the populations within parishes on
the basis of race when relying upon estimates of the total
voting age population.

The presence of prisons and military

bases within some parishes also presented a measurement
problem. Additionally, providing an accurate count of
"other" voters (e.g., Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans,
and Blacks) of voting age presented a problem.
reasons,

For these

the variable white registered voters was a better

indicator for white voters and allowed the elimination of
many inaccuracies which may have occurred had white voting
age population been used.
The data provided for the sociodemographic variables
were drawn from books published by the United States Bureau
of Census.

Data on white registered voters were obtained

from the Louisiana Office of Secretary of State.

Summary
The data were obtained from official documents
published by the State of Louisiana and the United States
government.

Voter registration figures and election
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statistics were gathered from publications issued by the
Louisiana Office of Secretary of State and the works of
Weber

(1988, 1989) and Engstrom (1988).

Incumbency or prior

judicial experience and elective office were drawn from The
American Bench:

Judges of the Nation.

Campaign expenditure

information were obtained from official documents available
in Louisiana’s Campaign Finance Office.

The socioeconomic

data were obtained from Census of Population published by
the United States Department of Commerce.
The statistical

tests utilized to estimate the

parameters of my comprehensive model as well as three
separate models of voter turnout in Louisiana's judicial
elections are discussed in Chapter Four.

The results of the

empirical tests for the previously discussed hypotheses are
also contained in the following chapter.
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Chapter Four
Multivariate Analysis

The dependent variable in this study is turnout percent
in each election.

Turnout percent is standardized as a

proportion of the total vote received by all the candidates
competing in each election divided by the total voting age
population within each district.
Four separate aggregate-level models have been devised
to explain electoral participation in state nonpartisan
trial and appellate court elections.
contain a contextual component,
candidates’ attributes,

The four models

characteristics of

the sociodemographic characteristics

of the electorate within each district,

and an integrated or

general model containing variables from the first three
models.

In other words,

included in each model

the impact of the variables

is measured separately with the use

of standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients
and in a general multivariate analysis which integrates
components of the three models.

The Pearson Correlation

Coefficient has also been employed to measure the bivariate
relationship between the dependent and independent
var iables.
The model has also been tested for violation of
assumptions (multico11inearity, heteroscedasticity, and
autocorrelation).

These tests have been conducted,

since

82
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the data employed in this research resulted in pooled crosssectional data.

Cross-sectional data are data "in which the

researcher has observations on a set of variables at a given
point in time across many nations, states, counties, cities,
or other units of analysis"

(Ostrom 1978, 5).

In this

analysis the independent variables are examined for judicial
elections which occurred from 1981 through 1988.
words,

In other

the characteristics of the candidates, attributes of

the electorate,

and the political environment

in which the

elections occurred are analyzed in Louisiana nonpartisan
contested judicial elections from 1981 through 1988 to
determine the impact these factors may have on electoral
participation.
Multicollinearity occurs when independent variables in
a regression model are intercorrelated.

The variables

special election, percent black high school graduates, and
percent white high school graduates have been excluded from
the models because of the presence of multicollinearity.
The first test conducted to test for this problem was
to examine the bivariate coefficients to determine the
relationship between each independent variable and other
variables.

The cutoff point employed to eliminate the

previously mentioned variables was .80.

In short,

independent variables yielding bivariate coefficients equal
to or exceeding

.80 were excluded from the models.

It is

important to emphasize that there were some variables which
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were expected to and did correlate with other
variables.

independent

For example, black median family income was

expected to have a high correlation with median family
income,

since black family income is a subset of overall

family income.

Similarly, white-collar and blue-collar

workers were expected to correlate because both factors are
required to determine overall workers in the population.
The variable blue-collar worker has not been selected for
inclusion in the present study because it was not
hypothesized as increasing levels of voter turnout.

Since

some variables were expected to correlate with other
variables, other statistical

tests were performed to aid in

the determination as to whether multicollinearity was

in

fact a problem.
A second statistical

test which has been performed to

detect multicollinearity was to regress each independent
variable on the remaining independent variables.
excluded variables had a R2 close to 1.00.

The

This procedure

allowed for a determination of which variable was linearly
related to other independent variables.
The final test which has been performed to detect the
presence of multicollinearity is the examination of the
stability of coefficients of the independent variables when
placed

in different samples or models.

The coefficients for

the variables which have been excluded indicated a dramatic
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change in the magnitude of the coefficient estimates across
different specifications of the models.
Since the data analyzed in this research resulted in a
pooled cross-sectional time model,

the independent variables

were tested to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity.
Heteroscedasticity refers to the situation in which—
contrary to the assumption of homoscedasticity— the error
term in a regression model does not have constant variance
(Berry and Feldman 1985).

In other words, variance in the

error term varies as the value of the independent variable
increases.
To test for this violation of assumption,

a residual

variable has been created in which the absolute values of
the residual have been regressed on all independent
variables.

The bivariate correlation coefficients between

the residual and the independent variables were examined to
determine whether heteroscedasticity was a problem.

Table

One contains the coefficients of the bivariate correlation
of the residual with the independent variable.
Since the independent variables race, campaign
expenditure, and white registered voters appeared to
correlate with the residual

in the bivariate analysis, T-

test were conducted to determine the significance of this
correlation.

The results of the T-test for these variables

indicate that their correlation with the residual
statistically significant.

is not

The significance of t for the
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variable race yielded a coefficient of +.3012,

for campaign

expenditure +.2100, and for white registered voters +.1952.
These tests indicate that heteroscedasticity was not a
problem in this analysis of voter turnout

in judicial

elections.
Finally,

the cross-sectional

data relied upon in this

study has been tested to determine whether autocorrelation
presented a problem.

Autocorrelation or serial correlation

occurs when observations at different points in time are
correlated.

The Durbin-Watson d-statistic has been employed

to test for autocorrelation.
theoretical distribution.

The Durbin test is based on a

The d-statistic was expected to

be small for positive autocorrelation,

large for negative

autocorrelation, and in the middle range for randomly
scattered residuals.

To be more specific,

are highly positively correlated,
zero;

if they are uncorrelated

"if the residuals

the values of d is near

it is near 2"

(Kendall

1976,

164).
The d-statistic yielded by the residuals in the present
research was +1.5971.

This statistic

indicates that no

serial correlation occurred.
In addition to performing the d-statistic

test,

scatterplots of the residuals against the predicted values
were examined.

The plots did not reveal a pattern between

the residuals and predicted values,
randomly scattered.

instead the values were

The results of the scatterplots were
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Table One
Coefficients Resulting from a Test
to Detect Heteroscedasticity

Variable

Pearson Coefficient

RACE

— .2358*

PRIOR JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE

— .1696

PRIOR ELECTIVE OFFICE

+.1773

CAMPAIGN SPENDING

+.2169*

HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

1819

AGE

+.1667

RURAL PERCENT

+.0949

WHITE REGISTERED VOTERS

+.2319*

COMPETITION

+.0871

MEDIAN INCOME

+.0302

HIGH VISIBILITY ELECTION

-.0197

WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS

-.1645

BLACK MEDIAN INCOME

+.1178

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

-.1458

CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION

-.1316

TYPE OF ELECTION

+.0697

■«•Significant at

.01 level
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similar to the results of the d-statistic.

It may be

concluded that autocorrelation was not present in the data
employed in this research.
The purpose of measuring the influence the variables
contained in these models may have on voter turnout

is to

determine the extent to which the present research adds to,
supports, or conflicts with existing studies on judicial
elections.

Results of Contextual Model
The contextual model contains those independent
variables which are indicators of the prevailing political
and structural context of each election.

This model of

voter turnout may be statistically depicted as follows:

TURNOUT = a + b ' (presidential election) + b*
(congressional election) + b' (high
visibility election) + b " (competitiveness)
b® (type of election

+

The variables presidential election, congressional
election, and competitiveness are included in this model
because existing research has revealed a relationship
between these variables and electoral participation in
judicial elections (Hannah 1972; Adamany and Dubois 1976;
Dubois 1980).

These researchers found evidence which

suggest that the variable competitiveness has a slight
influence on voter turnout.

Competitiveness was also found

to have a greater impact on the behaviors of candidates with
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regards to seeking campaign funds or the manner in which
they conducted their campaigns rather than encouraging
people to participate in these election (Boyd 1989).

The

variable competitiveness has been included to determine
whether these findings are valid for state nonpartisan trial
and intermediate appellate court elections.
Hannah

(1972) and Adamany and Dubois (1976) analyzed

election scheduling in their respective works.

These

researchers found evidence which suggest that voter turnout
in judicial elections was greatest in those elections held
concurrently with presidential elections followed by
congressional elections.

Turnout was found to be lowest in

off-year elections.
For analyses purposes,

the variable election scheduling

has been divided into three separate dummy variables to
explain variations in voter turnout in state judicial
elections.

These variables are presidential election,

congressional election,

and high visibility election

gubernatorial and mayoral races).

(e.g.,

The variable off-year

election has been excluded from this analysis,

since a

preliminary run of the data revealed a multicollinearity
problem with the variable off-year

(special) election and

the variables presidential election and congressional
election.

Furthermore,

the effects of this variable will be

captured by the inclusion of the variable high visibility
election.
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The variable type of election has also been included in
the contextual model.

Previously discussed literature have

suggested that whether an election is a primary or general
election has an impact on voter turnout

(Key 1949; Boyd

1989; Wright 1989).
The following sections contain discussions of the
hypotheses presented

in Chapter Three and whether the data

support or contradict the expected findings.
coefficients for the variables contained
model are illustrated in Table Two.

The

in the contextual

This model of voter

turnout in judicial elections explains 33 percent of the
variance in electoral participation in Louisiana contested
nonpartisan judicial elections.

Election Scheduling
H ::

With all else being equal, state judicial
elections held concurrently with presidential
elections will have the highest level of
voter turnout.

Of the three variables
presidential election,

(high visibility election,

congressional election)

included to

explain the relationship between election scheduling and
voter turnout,

the standardized regression coefficient for

the variable presidential election indicates the weakest
correlation with voter turnout.

Surprisingly,

the

coefficient for this variable suggest that this variable did
not have a significant

impact on electoral

the judicial elections examined

participation in

in the present study.
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Table Two
Pearson Correlation Coefficients and
Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients
for Variables Included in Contextual Model

Variable

Pearson
Correlation

b

Beta

Gig. of T

Presidential Election

+.005

-.062

-.093

+.1420

Congressional Election

+.327**

+.132

+ .416

+.0000***

High Visibility
Election

+.352**

+.157

+ .429

+.0000***

Competitiveness

-.246*

-1,420

— .166
E-03

+.0302**

Type of Election

-.110

— .060

+.2429

-.022

R2 = +.33
***<.01, one-tail test
**<.05, one-tail test
*<.10, one-tail test
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One plausible explanation for the weak correlation
between the variable presidential election and electoral
participation in the present research and the strong
correlation found by Hannah

(1972), Adamany and Dubois

(1976), and Dubois (1980) may be that the factors which
affect state trial and intermediate appellate court
elections are different from those which affect state
supreme court elections, particularly when the char
acteristics of the electorate within specific districts
are taken into consideration.
The weak correlation between the variable presidential
election and voter turnout

in judicial elections may also be

attributed to the nonpartisan judicial ballot.

Even though

Louisiana includes the party affiliation of judicial
candidates on the judicial ballot,

the presence of party

identification and the coattail effect has been found to
have little significance in explaining voter turnout in
Louisiana nonpartisan judicial elections.
Additionally,

the performance of the variable

presidential election may be explained by "rolloff".
Rolloff is defined as "the tendency of weary or confused
voters to refrain from voting on offices or measures located
near the bottom of a lengthy b a llot" (Walker 1966).
result, rolloff is more likely to occur

As a

in less salient

contests such as judicial elections which are held
concurrently with more salient race such as presidential
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general.

In other words,

in this analysis it is likely that

voters who participated in presidential elections did not
complete their ballots or participate in the less salient
judicial races.
The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that holding
judicial elections at the same time as presidential general
elections did not encourage voter participation in the
judicial elections being analyzed.

The performance of this

variable supports and conflicts in part with existing
studies (Hannah 1972; Adamany and Dubois 1976; Dubois 1980).
According to Hannah

(1972) and Dubois

their respective studies,

(1980),

in part,

in

judicial elections held

concurrently with presidential general elections are
expected to have the greatest influence on voter turnout.
Dubois

(1980) also concluded that the impact of a concurrent

presidential election on nonpartisan judicial elections may
be negligible.

This finding of Dubois may be used to

explain the performance of the variable presidential
election in the present study which focuses on nonpartisan
judicial contests.

The coefficients revealed by this

variable validate the exclusion of the partisan
identification of judicial candidates, even though Louisiana
provides this information on the judicial ballot in
nonpartisan races.

HB:

With all else being equal, state judicial
elections held concurrently with mid-term
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congressional elections will have moderate
levels of voter turnout.
The explanatory power of the variable congressional
election was found to be greater than that of the variable
presidential election.
findings of Hannah
Dubois

(1980).

This finding differs from the

(1972), Adamany and Dubois

(1976), and

The variable congressional election yielded

a statistically significant positive correlation with the
dependent variable voter turnout.

The coefficients for this

variable indicate that state judicial elections held
concurrently with congressional races did increase voter
participation in the judicial contests.
Like the variable presidential election,

the

performance of the variable congressional election in the
present study as opposed to its performance
studies

in existing

(Hannah 1972; Adamany and Dubois 1976; Dubois

1979,

1980) may be attributed to the units of analysis— non
partisan contested trial court elections— employed in this
research.

The units of analysis in existing studies have

been state supreme court elections.

Therefore,

it may be

concluded that the factors which influence electoral
participation in state nonpartisan trial and intermediate
appellate court elections may be different from those
influencing participation in state supreme court contests.
Additionally, voters may view the election of congressional
candidates as having a greater

impact on their daily lives

and economic well-being than presidential elections.

Many
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congressional candidates are incumbents who have established
name familiarity with voters and have earned the loyalty of
their constituents.

On the other hand, most presidential

candidates are more likely to be newcomers rather than
incumbents.

As a result,

the choices in congressional races

may be clearer to voters than their choices in presidential
contests.

In fact, voters may be less likely to experience

stress when voting for congressional candidates and
therefore participate in the judicial contests located at
the bottom of the ballot.
Another explanation for the performance of the variable
congressional election is that Louisiana

judicial elections

are usually scheduled to coincide with congressional
elections.

For this reason, many voters who are drawn to

the polls for the salient congressional elections also cast
ballots in the judicial races.
Though the magnitude of the relationship between
congressional election and voter turnout remained
positive direction,

there was a significant

in a

increase in the

explanatory power of the variable congressional election
once placed in the regression equation.

The Pearson

correlation coefficient for this variable is +.327.
Controlling for other contextual variables enhances the
relationship between congressional election and electoral
participation.

The Beta coefficient for this variable is

+.4 1 6 .
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Ha :

State judicial elections held concurrently
with high visibility or off-year races,
ceteris paribus, will have low levels of
voter turnout.

The variable high visibility election was found to have
a significant influence on voter turnout in the state non
partisan trial court elections analyzed in this study.

High

visibility elections are those gubernatorial and mayoral
contests which occurred in Louisiana from 1981 through 1988.
These elections were classified as high visibility elections
because they occur during nonpresidential and noncongressional elections,

yet have the tendency to draw voters to

the polls with nearly the same intensity as presidential
general elections and U.S. Senatorial races.

The

performance of this variable in the contextual model
indicates that Louisiana voters participated at a higher
level

in judicial elections when high visibility races were

on the ballot.

The Pearson correlation coefficient for this

variable is +.352.
(Beta)

The standardized regression coefficient

is +.429.

The coefficients for the variable high visibility
election captured the effect of Hannah
Dubois

(1972), Adamany and

(1976), D u b o i s ’ (1980) variable off-year election.

These scholars’ off-year elections were those held during
nonpresidential and noncongressiona1 elections and are
therefore comparable to the variable high visibility
election in the present study.

The positive Beta

coefficient for this variable contradicts the findings of
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these scholars.

These researchers found evidence which

suggest that electoral participation .should be lowest in
judicial elections held concurrently with off-year
elections.
The significant positive correlation of the variable
high visibility election with the dependent variable voter
turnout suggests that Louisiana voters were more likely to
participate in judicial contests held concurrently with high
visibility contests from 1981 to 1988.

The explanation for

this finding follows the same logic as the one presented to
explain the performance of the variable congressional
election.

In short, voters perceive a personal stake in

high visibility elections
Additionally,

(gubernatorial or mayoral).

the name familiarity of the candidates

participating in these races and the saliency of the
contests at the top of the ballot may encourage voters to
participate in the judicial elections.
Another factor which may explain the coefficients
yielded for the variable high visibility election is the
campaign expenditures of gubernatorial and mayoral
candidates.

These candidates spend large sums of money

during their campaigns,

thus making the elections more

salient to voters and in turn increase voter turnout
(Patterson and Caldeira 1983).

This increased voter

interest and turnout in the high visibility elections may be
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carried over to the judicial races located at the bottom of
the ballot.
Finally,

the elections of governors and mayors may be

viewed by many voters as state and local races.

Conversely,

voters may view the election of the president as a national
election.

Voters distinguishing between state and local and

national races may result

in them not casting ballots in

state and local races, specifically judicial contests, which
are included on the election ballot for president.

Con

versely, voters may participate in judicial races held
concurrently with congressional,

gubernatorial or mayoral

races because they view these contests as state or local
races.

It may be possible that not only are more salient

races located at the top of the ballot given preference by
voters, but national races may be given higher priority than
state and local contests when included on the same ballot.
B o y d ’s <1989) ballot attractiveness hypothesis supports
the above arguments to some degree.
author, an individual

According to the

is less likely to vote when there is a

fewer number of salient statewide contests on a presidential
ballot.

This hypothesis provides a contrasting argument to

those of Campbell

(1966), Hannah

(1972), Adamany and Dubois

(1976), and Dubois (1980) which state that voter turnout
increase as a result of presidential elections and mid-term
elections.

Unlike these researchers,

Boyd contended that is

local statewide contests such as gubernatorial

races which
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increase voter turnout in presidential races.
Boyd

(1989, 738),

According to

"gubernatorial races on a presidential

year ballot increase voting rates by six percentage points,
drawing people to the polls who would not otherwise vote in
presidential elections."

Even though B o y d ’s conclusions

differ somewhat from the findings of this study,

the present

research as well B o y d ’s suggests that voters do distinguish
between a national race

(presidential)

and state

(congressional and gubernatorial) and local

(mayoral) races.

B o y d ’s ballot attractiveness hypothesis may account for
the performances of the variable presidential election and
that of the variables congressional and high visibility
election.

Judicial elections held concurrently with local

and statewide races had higher levels of electoral
participation than those held during presidential elections.

Competitiveness
H *:

With all else being equal, electoral
participation is expected to be greatest in
competitive contests.

The coefficients for the variable competitiveness
reveal a positive correlation with the dependent variable
voter turnout.

The Pearson coefficient yielded by this

independent variable was -.246.

The standardized regression

coefficient for this variable was -.166.

The one-tail

significance test indicated a statistically significant
relationship between competitiveness and voter turnout in
Louisiana

judicial elections.

The negative magnitude of the
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standardized coefficient for this variable was expected,
since competitiveness was measuring as the percentage which
result when dividing the winner votes minus the runnei— up
votes by the total votes cast in each election.
the percentage which resulted,
judicial race.

The smaller

the more competitive the

For this reason,

in spite of the negative

beta coefficient for the independent variable competitive
ness,

it was found to encourage voter participation in the

judicial elections being analyzed.
The results of the coefficients revealed by the
variable competitiveness contradicts D u b o i s ’ <1980)
contention that competition has no effect on voter turnout
in nonpartisan judicial elections.

The effects of

competition on voter turnout in judicial elections may not
be as great as its impact

in congressional, presidential, or

other elections. Despite this observation,

it has been found

to influence electoral participation in L o u isiana’s
nonpartisan contested judicial contests from 1981 through
1988.

Type of Election
H 3:

With all else being equal, electoral
participation will be greater in general
elections.

H A:

Ceteris p aribus, electoral participation will
decrease in primary elections.

Since this variable was scored "1" for general
elections and "0" for primary elections,

the negative
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magnitude of the regression coefficient indicates that voter
turnout is insignificantly greater

in primary judicial

elections rather than general elections.

The Pearson

coefficient for this variable was -.110.

The standardized

regression coefficient for the variable type of election was
-.060.

The coefficients yielded by this variable add no

explanatory power to the contextual model.
The negative direction of the coefficient supports the
findings of Boyd
(1949).

(1989) and Wright

(1989) instead of Key

Key (1949) contended that voter turnout should be

greater in general elections rather than primary elections
in the South.

Boyd

(1989) and Wright

(1989) concluded that

voter turnout should be higher in primary elections rather
than runoff primaries and general elections.
Dubois

In fact,

(1980, 40) concluded that "turnout decline in

nonpartisan general elections."
Upon reflection,

the performance of the variable type

of election should have been expected.

The reason being

that given the election system of Louisiana, particularly in
such races as gubernatorial, mayoral, and senatorial, voters
are more likely to vote in primary elections with the hope
that their preferred candidate receives the necessary
majority in order to avoid a run-off election.
cases,

In most

if a runoff election is necessary, electoral

participation will decrease in the general election.

In

such instances, many voters make a rational choice not to
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participate in the runoff contest based on the belief that
their votes will not affect the outcome of the general
election.
For example,

in most races Republican voters tend to

vote in a bloc because this party is the minority political
party in the State of Louisiana.

This point may be

exemplified even more by directing attention to
gubernatorial races in Louisiana.

The Republican Party

usually nominates only one candidate, whereas the Democratic
Party may nominate three or more candidates.

As a result,

the Republican Party as well as voters belonging to this
party will attempt to win in the primary election in an
attempt to avoid a runoff general election against a
Democratic candidate.

Results of Candidate Model
This model of voter turnout contains components of the
characteristics of judicial candidates participating in each
election.

The dimensions of the candidate model are as

f o 1 lows :

TURNOUT = a + b' (campaign spending) + b® (prior
elective experience) + b ’ (race of
candidate) + b* (prior judicial
exper ie n c e )

The variable race of candidates has been examined
existing studies of judicial elections
et al.

1984; Alozie 1988).

in

(Collins 1980; Atkins

These scholars concluded

in
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their respective works that the race of judicial candidates
did increase voter turnout.

An additional finding was that

the electoral participation of lower income blacks increased
at a higher rate than other blacks or similarly situated
whites when black candidates participated

in judicial

contests.
The variables campaign spending and prior

judicial

experience have not been examined by judicial scholars to
explain variations in voter turnout.

The present study

seeks to examine the influence these variables may have on
voter turnout.

The present study also seeks to determine

whether the findings of congressional
1971; Mayhew 1974; Abramowitz
1981,

1987; Alford and Hibbing

scholars

(Erikson

1975; Cover 1977; Jacobson
1981,

1987; Bauer and Hibbing

1989) may be generalized to explain variations in voter
turnout

in judicial elections on the basis of the campaign

expenditure of

candidates and incumbency.

Finally, the

variable prior

elective office has been included to

determine whether the previous occupation of judicial
candidates, specifically those holding elective office,
stimulate voter turnout.

In short,

candidates who have been successful

those judicial
in their bids for

elective offices, excluding judgeships, in

the past should

increase voter

judicial

turnout and the saliency of

elections in which their names appear on the ballot.
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The results of the candidate model are illustrated in
Table Three.

The candidate model of voter turnout explains

11 percent of the variance in voter turnout in Louisiana
trial and intermediate judicial elections from 1981 through
1988.

Camoaion Spending
H 7:

High levels of campaign spending will produce
high levels of voter participation in
judicial elections, ceteris p a r i b u s .

The variable campaign spending was found to have the
greatest explanatory power
variable voter turnout.
this variable is +.321,
coefficient

is +.330.

in relation to the dependent

The Pearson coefficient yielded by
and the standardized regression
The magnitude of this variable did

not decrease significantly when placed in the regression
equation with the other

independent variables.

High levels

of campaign spending are associated with high levels of
voter turnout.

In other words,

judicial elections in which

candidates spent more money on their campaigns were
characterized by higher

levels of voter turnout.

To be more

specific, for every thousand dollar a candidate spent on
his/her campaign,

voter turnout increased by +.087.

Prior Elective Office
H B:

With all else being equal, the presence of a
candidate who has held prior elective office
will be associated with high levels of voter
turnout.
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The variable prior elective office added nothing to the
explanatory power of the candidate model.

The Pearson

correlation coefficient for this variable is +.048, and the
standardized regression coefficient is +.030.

This variable

had no impact on voter turnout in judicial elections.
The coefficients for this independent variable suggest
that judicial candidates who had previously held some type
of elective office did not increase v o ters’ interest in
judicial elections nor encourage them to participate in
these elections.

Voters were no more likely to participate

in judicial elections when candidates who had previously
held elective office sought judgeships than they were in
those elections involving candidates who had not previously
held any type of elective office.

Race of Judicial Candidates
H ,:

With all else being equal, the presence of a
black judicial candidate on the ballot will
increase black voter turnout and thus turnout
overal1.

H itj

The presence of a black candidate in a
judicial race, ceteris paribus, will increase
white voter turnout and thus turnout overall.

A major issue involved in challenges to Louisiana
electoral structure for electing judges is the existence of
racial polarization in voting.
1),

According to Grofman (1989,

"racially polarized voting exists where there is a

consistent relationship between the race of the voter and
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Table Three
Pearson Correlation Coefficients and
Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients
for Variables Included in Candidate Model

Variable

Pearson
Correlation

b

Beta

Sig. of T

Campaign Spending

+.321**

+ .027

+ .330

+.0004***

Prior Elective Office

+ .048

+ .014

+ .030

+.3755

Race of Candidate

+ .060

+ .035

+ .098

+.1509

Prior Judicial
Experience

-.008

2.636
E-03

8.503
E-03

+.4645

R2 = +.11
***<.01, one-tail test
**<.05, one-tail test
*<.10, one-tail test
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the way in which the voters vote, i.e., where black voters
and white voters vote differently."
Because of the presence of racial polarization in
voting in those judicial elections in which black candidates
compete against white candidates,
elections is expected to increase.
research,

voter turnout in such
According to existing

(Collins 1980; Atkins et al.

1984; Alozie 1988),

blacks are more likely to vote in judicial contests when a
black candidate’s name is on the ballot.

On the other hand,

to off-set an increase in black electoral participation
which result when black

judicial candidates seek judgeships,

white voters are expected to vote at higher

levels.

This

phenomenon occurred during the 1984 and 1988 presidential
campaigns in which Jesse Jackson sought the presidency.

The

same thing occurs in school board races, c o u n c i 1person
elections,

and in mayoral races when black candidates oppose

white office-seekers.
Whereas the whites and blacks who decide to participate
in judicial elections vote along racial

lines,

the variable

race of judicial candidates was found to have no impact on
increasing voter turnout.

The Pearson correlation

coefficient for this independent variable is +.060 and the
Beta coefficient

is +.098.

In other words, racial

polarization in voting may occur when black and white
judicial candidates oppose each other,

but this factor does

not stimulate v o t e r s ’ interest or motivate them to vote at
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higher

levels in such elections.

This finding conflicts

with the findings of existing studies
et al.

1984; Alozie 1988)

(Collins 1980; Atkins

in which scholars have concluded

that the presence of black judicial candidates on the ballot
has a major impact on electoral participation.

Prior Judicial Experience
H,,;

With all else being equal, an election
involving an incumbent or a candidate with
prior judicial experience will stimulate
voter turnout.

The variable prior

judicial experience was found to be

the least statistically significant independent variable
contained

in the candidate model.

The Pearson coefficient

for this variable is -.008 and the standardized regression
coefficient is 8.504

(E-03).

These coefficients suggest

that voter turnout was increased slightly, but
insignificantly,

when newcomers or challengers competed

rather than by the participation of incumbents.

In fact,

the presence of an incumbent in a judicial contest had no
impact on voter turnout.
The expectation was that prior judicial experience
would

increase the name familiarity of judicial candidates,

thus increasing voter turnout.
candidates with prior

Additionally,

incumbents or

judicial experience were expected to

increase levels of voter participation because they attract
greater amounts of campaign finances.

For this reason it

has been argued that incumbents are able to spend more on

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

109
their campaigns which is likely to increase the saliency of
the elections as well as voter turnout.
However,

the variable did not perform as hypothesized.

The actual performance of the independent variable prior
judicial experience supports Dubois (1980) contention that
name familiarity does not draw voters to the polls or
increase voter turnout.

Instead this factor has been found

to influence vote choice or candidate preference.
"the cue of incumbency may reveal

In fact,

itself to some voters only

after they have stepped into the voting booth"

(Dubois 1980,

80) .

Results of Sociodemographic Model
The sociodemographic model contains variables
representing select characteristics of the overall
electorate within each judicial district being analyzed.
The variables included in this model are as follows:

TURNOUT = a + b ' (black median family income) + b®
(percentage of white registered voters)
+ b ^ (percent population residing in
rural areas) + b
(percentage of
population 35-69 year old Cage]) + b “
(median family income) + b* (percent of
voting age population that has a high
school diploma) + b ’ (percent whitecollar workers)

The above variables were selected for inclusion in this
model because existing research has revealed a correlation
between these variables and voter turnout

(Collins 1980;

Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Atkins et al.

1984).

Whereas
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Wolfinger and Rosenstone

(1980) focused their attentions on

electoral participation in presidential elections,
present study like Collins

(1980) and Atkins et al.

the
(1984)

examines the relationship between voter turnout and
sociodemographic factors in state judicial elections.
Despite this fact,
of Collins (1980)

the present study differs from the works
and Atkins et al.

(1984), since they

focused only on black voter turnout instead of overall
electoral participation in judicial elections.
The inclusion of sociodemographic variables will allow
a determination as to whether the demographic factors that
influence electoral participation in presidential elections
are typical or atypical of the forces that impact on voter
turnout in state judicial elections.

The results of the

sociodemographic model are illustrated in Table Four.

This

model explains 16 percent of the variance in voter turnout
in Louisiana nonpartisan contested judicial elections held
from 1981 through

H ij?

1988.

With all else being equal, elections held in
districts with voters of high levels of
educational attainment should be
characterized by high levels of voter
turnout.

The variable percent high school graduates was found to
have an effect on voter turnout

in judicial elections.

Even

though the negative direction of the coefficients yielded by
this variable differ from the positive coefficients revealed
in the work of Wolfinger and Rosenstone

(1980)

in their
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Table Four
Pearson Correlation Coefficients and
Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients
for Variables Included in Sociodemographic Model

Variable

Pearson
Correlation

b

Beta

Sig. of T

Black Median Income

-. 199

4.659
E-06

+ . 133

+.2161

White Registered
Voters

-.065

-.132

-.114

+.1569

Rural

+.270*

+. 088

+ .154

+.2316

Age

— .048

-.191

-.071

+.2246

White-Collar Workers

-.254

+. 444

+ .207

+.1676

Median Income

-.243

4.199

-.155

+.1259
E —06

Percent of High
School Graduates

-.349**

-.847

-.438

+.0155*

R2 = +.16
***<.01, one-tail test
**<.05, one-tail test
*<.10, one-tail test
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analysis of presidential elections,
same.

the premise remains the

According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980),

education was found to be the most significant demographic
variable in explaining voter turnout
elections.

in presidential

This finding also holds true in state judicial

elections, specifically Louisiana judicial elections.
The educational attainment of the electorate was found
to have an impact on voter turnout.

In the present study,

judicial elections held in districts consisting of less
educated voters were characterized by higher

levels of voter

turnout than those elections held in districts with voters
of higher

levels of educational attainment.

An explanation

which may explain the unpredicted performance of this
variable is that most voters do not perceive judges as
policymakers
1989).

(Vines and Jacob 1971; Miller

1978; Haydel

Whereas voters with high levels of education were

more likely to participate in presidential elections
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), the same is not true in
state judicial elections.

A plausible explanation for this

is that these voters are likely to have higher incomes and
are motivated to vote in presidential races in order to
protect or ensure their economic or self-interest
1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

(Frey

Congress as well as

the President are involved in deciding the budget, whether
taxes will be increased, and the overall economic well-being
of the nation.

On the other hand, state judges are not
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viewed nor are they active participants in determining
economic matters.

For this reason,

judicial elections held

in districts with voters of high levels of education were
not found to have high levels of electoral participation.
In other words,

the political stakes for educated

voters may differ in state trial and appellate court
elections as opposed to presidential general elections.
Downs

(1957) rational actor model may explain the behavior

of voters with high levels of educational attainment in
judicial elections.

These voters may make a rational choice

not to participate in these elections because they perceive
themselves as receiving

less benefits from successful

judicial candidates. Similarly,

the more educated voters may

undergo a cost-benefit analysis

(Riker and Oidershook 1968)

in which they perceive the cost

(e.g.,

time required to vote

and to inform themselves about the candidates) of partici
pating in judicial elections as exceeding the benefits they
will receive if a particular candidate wins.
This finding differ from Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s
(1980) findings in their examination of voter turnout in
presidential contests.

These scholars found a positive

correlation between high educational attainment and the
probability of voting.
The work of Patterson and Caldeira
focused on voter turnout
the above statements.

(1983)

in which they

in gubernatorial elections supports

The results of the socioeconomic and
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general models in their study suggested that education does
not explain variations in electoral participation to the
same degree in other elections as it did in the presidential
general elections examined by Wolfinger and Rosenstone
< 1980) .
Additionally, because individuals with less education
are more likely to come in contact with members of the
judiciary than persons who are better educated
1983; U.S. Department of Justice 1983,

(Hindelang

1987; Flowers 1989),

the former may view the election of judges as a personal
stake for them.

Whereas those with higher educational

attainment are more likely to participate in presidential
and congressional contests because they perceive themselves
as having personal stakes in the electoral success of
particular candidates,

this may well be the case in judicial

races for the less educated.

For example,

if one were to

visit any city or district court in Louisiana or any other
state, most of the individuals with cases, whether they are
misdemeanors or felonies, pending in these courts are "more
likely to be poor, uneducated, male, unemployed,
(Flowers 1989).

For this reason,

and black"

judicial elections may be

more salient to the less educated and their families than to
voters with higher levels of educational

attainment.

As a result of the following explanation,

less educated

voters may perceive themselves as having personal stakes in
the election of particular

judges.

These voters may perform
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a cost-benefit analysis

(Riker and Oidershook

encourage them to vote,

since they perceive the outcome of

judicial

1968) which

elections as having an impact on their or their

family members daily lives.

For example,

these

voters

may

believe it is in their best interest to aid in the selection
of a judge who is known for his/her fairness when reaching
decisions or a judge who does not impose harsh sentences for
minor infractions.

Therefore,

like voters with high levels

of educational attainment, voters with

less educate make a

rational choice to participate in state judicial elections.
The political stakes for the latter voters may be argued to
be higher in state trial and appellate court elections
rather than presidential general elections.

H,:#

With all else being equal, elections held in
districts with voters of high incomes are
expected to have high levels of voter
turnout.

The variable included in the sociodemographic model to
test this hypothesis is median family income.

This variable

was found to have no impact on the dependent variable voter
turnout.

This finding is contrary to that of Wolfinger and

Rosenstone (1980).

These scholars concluded that voter

turnout in presidential elections increased with income.
the other hand,

On

the results of the present study suggest

that judicial elections held in districts consisting of low
income voters were associated with higher

levels of turnout
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than those elections held in districts consisting of voters
with high incomes.
The rationale for the above finding is that people with
lower levels of income are more likely than those with
higher levels of income to come in contact with members of
the judiciary (Hindelang
1983,

1983; U.S. Department of Justice

1987; Flowers 1989), therefore the former voters are

more likely to participate in judicial races.

Whereas

judicial races may lack saliency for voters with higher
incomes, such races may be salient for lower income voters
who are more likely to know the names of lawyers who
subsequently become judicial candidates within their
districts.
An additional explanation which may be provided to
explain the performance of the variable income is K e nney’s
(1983, 322) findings that "Southern states

(Arkansas,

Louisiana, Mississippi) have high turnout rates and
extremely low per capita income figures."

In his analysis

of gubernatorial primaries in the United States,

the author

found a negative statistically significant relationship
between income and turnout.

Hi,;

With all else being equal, elections held in
districts consisting of white-collar workers
should be characterized by high levels of
electoral participation.

Wolfinger and Rosenstone
the impact the occupational

(1980) in their analysis of

level of the electorate may
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on voter turnout in presidential elections found that
increased job status increased the probability of voting.
These scholars concluded that increased job status or being
a white-collar worker increased the likelihood of voting.
However,

the relationship between occupational

level

and the likelihood of voting was not found to be significant
in this analysis of voter turnout in judicial elections.
Despite the magnitude of the standardized coefficient for
this variable,

the significance test (+.3352)

indicates that

the variable white-collar workers did not significantly
correlate with the dependent variable— voter turnout.

H

Elections held in districts with large
percentages of white registered voters are
expected to have high levels of voter
turnout, ceteris p a r i b u s .

Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) concluded that whites
were more likely to vote than blacks in presidential general
elections.

The only exception these scholars found was that

voter turnout among lower

income and less educated blacks

exceeded that of similarly situated whites.

Whites in

general were more likely to vote than blacks.
The coefficients yielded for the variable white
registered voter percent was found to have no impact on
voter turnout in the state trial and intermediate court
elections examined in this study.

Judicial elections held

in districts with larger percentages of white voters were
not found to have higher levels of voter turnout than those
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elections held in districts with larger percentages of black
voters.
The explanatory power of the variable white registered
voter percent may be attributed to the low visibility of
judicial races as opposed to presidential elections.

H,*:

With all else being equal, elections held in
districts consisting of low income black
voters are expected to be characterized by
high levels of voter participation.

The variable black median family income was chosen for
inclusion in the sociodemographic model to measure the
relationship between lower income blacks and electoral
participation in state judicial elections.
and Wolfinger and Rosenstone

Shingles (1981)

(1980) concluded that lower

class blacks were more likely to vote than similarly
situated whites in presidential general elections.
The coefficients revealed for this variable support the
contentions of Verba and Nie (1972) and Abramson and
Claggett

(1989) that there is no significant difference in

black-white electoral participation.
Nie

According to Verba and

(1972) this is especially true when such factors as

education,

income,

and occupational

levels are controlled

for .

H

Ceteris p a r i b u s , elections held in districts
with voters ranging in age from 35 to 69 are
expected to have high levels of voter
turnout.
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According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone

(1980), age was

the second most important variable in explaining voter
turnout

in presidential elections.

these scholars,

Despite the findings of

the variable age was found to have no impact

on voter turnout in state judicial elections.

H

With all else being equal, elections held in
districts located in rural areas should be
characterized by high levels of electoral
participation.

The coefficients for the variable rural

indicate that

elections held in rural areas did not have higher

levels of

electoral participation than those held in urban areas.
This finding contradicts the works of Key (1949), Campbell
et al.

(1960), and Blank

(1974)

voter turnout was greater

in which they concluded that

in rural areas rather than urban

areas.

Results of General Model
Since the three separate models which have been devised
do not provide adequate explanations for the relationship
between select factors and electoral participation in state
judicial elections,

a general model which

integrates the

components of these three models has been devised.
contextual model explained 33 percent,
11 percent,

The

the candidate model

and the sociodemographic model explained 16

percent of the variance in electoral participation in state
judicial elections.

The general model consists of all of

the variables contained

in the simple models— candidate,
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contextual, and sociodemographic factors.

This model

explains 57 percent of the variance in electoral
participation in state trial and intermediate court
elections.

The general model of voter turnout is as

f o 1 lows :

TURNOUT = candidate model (race, campaign spending,
prior judicial experience, prior elective
office) + contextual model (presidential
election, congressional election, high
visibility election, type of election,
competitiveness) + sociodemographic model
(median family income, age, percent rural,
white-collar workers, black median income,
education, white registered voters)

The explanatory power of the general model of voter
turnout is much more powerful

than the individual models.

The explanatory power of the general model indicates that a
combination of factors influence voter turnout in judicial
elections.

This analysis demonstrates that taken

separately,

the dimensions of candidate attributes,

the

context of the electoral environment, nor the sociodemo
graphic characteristics of the electorate can sufficiently
explain variations in voter turnout in these elections.

The

coefficients yielded by this model are depicted in Table
Five.

The results of the general model are significant,

since they clearly indicate that a reliance or emphasis on
one set of dimensions will dramatically limit the
predictability of electoral participation in state judicial
elect ions.
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Table Five
Pearson Correlation Coefficients and
Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients
for Variables Included in General Model

Variable

Pearson
Correlation

b

Beta

Sig. of T

High Visibility

+.352**

+ . 179

+ .487

+ .0000***

Percent of High
School Graduates

-.349

-.377

-.194

+.1139

Congressional Election

+.327**

+ .132

+ .411

+.0000***

Campaign Spending

+.321**

+ .024

+ .290

+.0001***

Compet it ion

-.231

-1.035
E-04

-. 121

+.0718*

Rural Percent

+ .269

+ .158

+ .277

+.0544*

Prior Judicial Office

— .008

-.045

-.146

+.0551 *

White-collar Workers

-.254

+ .288

+ .134

+.2226

Race of Candidate

+. 060

+ .044

+ .124

+.0802*

Median Family Income

-.243

-3.952
E-06

-.146

+. 0863*

Presidential Election

+ .005

— .080

-.120

+.0650*

Prior Elective Office

+ .048

+ .052

+ .112

+.0725*

Type of Election

-.110

-.030

— .080

+.1454

Age

-.048

-.032

+ .032

+.3328

Black Median Income

-.199

-3.976
E-06
— .063

+ .114

+.2019

+. 055

+.2893

White Registered Voters -.065
Rz = +.57
***<.01, one-tail test
**<.05, one-tail test
*<.10, one-tail test
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The main contribution of the general model to judicial
election research is that it demonstrates;
scheduling

is the most

(1) election

important factor when explaining

differences in levels of voter turnout in judicial
elections,

(2) the campaign spending of judicial candidates

provides the second best explanation,

and

(3) the

sociodemographic variables found to be significant were
rural percent and median family income.

Voters were more

likely to participate in judicial elections which were held
concurrently with high visibility elections

(e.g.,

gubernatorial and mayoral races) and those held
simultaneously with congressional contests.

To a lesser

degree the independent variables competition and pres
idential election were found to increase electoral
participation when all other variables are controlled for.
Elections in which judicial candidates spent more on their
campaigns had higher

levels of voter turnout.

Other

noteworthy findings involving the candidate variables were
the performance of the independent variables prior

judicial

office, race of candidates, and prior elective office.
Those elections involving judicial candidates who had
previously held judicial office or some type of elective
office had higher

levels of voter turnout.

Additionally,

judicial races in which black candidates opposed white
candidates had higher levels of electoral participation.
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As hypothesized elections held in rural areas and those
in which voters had high median family income had higher
levels of electoral participation than contests held in
urban areas and in districts containing voters with low
median family income.
A noteworthy finding which was revealed when the
variables scholars (Hannah 1972; Adamany and Dubois 1976;
Dubois 1979,

1980) have considered in their research were

controlled for was the explanatory power of the variables
relied upon to measure the impact of election scheduling.
These scholars concluded in their respective works that
voter turnout in state supreme court elections was greatest
in those elections held concurrently with presidential
elections, followed by increased electoral participation in
judicial elections held concurrently with congressional
races.

They also stated that voter turnout should decrease

dramatically or be the least in off-year elections.

The

results of the present analysis indicate that voter turnout
was greatest
mayoral)
turnout

in high visibility

(e.g., gubernatorial and

and congressional elections,

followed by increased

in those judicial races held concurrently with

presidential races.
These researchers accounted for differences in voter
turnout when explaining the impact of the variable election
scheduling by focusing on the concept of "rolloff."

Rolloff

occurs when voters cast ballots for salient offices at the
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top of the ballot but fail to participate in elections at
the bottom of the ballot

(Dubois 1980).

Despite the findings of these scholars,

the results of

the present study indicate that voter turnout was greatest
in nonpartisan judicial elections held during off-year or
high visibility elections (e.g., gubernatorial and mayoral
races) and in concurrent congressional elections.

This

finding may require a re-examination of the concept
"rolloff."

Rolloff has customarily been attributed to the

saliency of offices at the top of the ballot

(Hannah 1972;

Adamany and Dubois 1976; Dubois 1980) or voter fatigue
(Walker

1966; Wright 1989) when faced with a lengthy ballot.

Most would argue that the performance of the variable
presidential election in the present research

is

predictability, since the units of analysis are nonpartisan
judicial elections.

However, both presidential and

congressional races (U.S. senatorial)

are partisan events in

which political parties play major roles.

In spite of this,

the present study found that judicial races held
concurrently with congressional races had less rolloff than
presidential races, since voter turnout

in judicial

elections held concurrently with congressional, elections was
higher.

Surely,

there must be another explanation to

explain this finding rather than relying upon the
differences between nonpartisan and partisan elections.
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Additionally» state political party organizations play major
roles in gubernatorial elections.
The present study suggests that rolloff may also be the
result of v o t e r s ’ perceiving a difference between ballots
containing national elections and those containing state and
local races.

In other words, another possible explanation

for rolloff is the willingness of voters to participate in
national elections and not state or local elections.

Voters

may view the officeholders in Washington, D.C. as
representing a different form of politics than state and
local officials.
offices

Even though U.S. congresspersons occupy

in Washington,

D.C., they are still perceived by the

voters to be state officeholders.
Another explanation may be B o y d ’s (1989) ballot
attractiveness hypothesis in which he contended that it is
local statewide contests such as gubernatorial races which
increased voter turnout in presidential races.
Boyd

(1989, 739),

year ballot

According to

"gubernatorial races on a presidential

increase voting rates by six percentage points,

drawing people to the polls who would not otherwise vote in
presidential elections."
Boyd argued that it is the saliency of local and
statewide races which bring voters to the polls.

Although

B o y d ’s findings differ somewhat from the conclusions of the
present analysis, his findings are relevant because he
distinguishes between the saliency of national,

state, and
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local contests when examining rolloff.

B o y d ’s conclusions

suggest that voters do in fact differentiate between
national and state or local electoral contests which

in turn

increases or depresses electoral participation.
The findings of congressional scholars
Mayhew 1974; Cover 1977; Parker and Parker

(Erikson 1971;
1980; Collie

1981; Garand and Gross 1984; Bauer and Nibbing
incumbency advantage can,

1989) on

to a certain extent, be

generalized when analyzing judicial

incumbents.

scholars concluded that congressional

These

incumbents have an

information advantage as well as an advantage when raising
and attracting campaign resources.

The findings of the

present study contradict the recent findings of Jacobson
(1987)

in his examination of congressional

incumbency

advantage.
Jacobson (1987) found evidence which suggest that
congressional races involving incumbents were no less
competitive than those which did not involve incumbents.

He

found that contests involving incumbent House members were
still competitive and that their margin of victory as well
as their success in their bids for reelection have declined
in subsequent elections.

Despite J a c o b s o n ’s contentions,

the presence of an incumbent in a judicial contest did have
an impact on voter turnout.
The variable campaign spending performed as expected.
Relying upon the findings of congressional

and gubernatorial
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scholars

(Heard I960; Adamany 1972; Owens 1973; Jacobson

1980; Caldeira and Patterson 1983; Patterson and Caldeira
1983)

in their analyses of the impact campaign spending may

have on voter turnout as a foundation for the hypothesis in
the present study reveal that campaign spending also has an
impact on electoral participation in judicial elections.
Therefore,
as existing

based upon findings in the present study as well
literature on other elections, campaign spending

may be said to influence voter participation.
The only sociodemographic variables which performed as
hypothesized when placed in the general model were median
family income and rural percent.
Rosenstone (1980),

Like Wolfinger and

the results of the present research

suggest that electoral participation increases with income.
Judicial elections held in districts consisting of voters
with high median family income were characterized with
higher

levels of voter turnout.

Like Key (1949), Campbell et al.

(1960), and Blank

(1974), this examination of voter turnout reveals that
turnout is greater

in those elections held in rural areas as

opposed to those held

in urban areas.

The nature of

politics in rural areas— being more personal— and the
presence of "Big Government"

in urban areas may account for

this observed difference in electoral participation.
There are several reasons for the performance of the
other sociodemographic variables included

in this analysis
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as opposed to their performance in the work of Wolfinger and
Rosenstone (1980).

First of all, the present study differs

from Wolfinger and R osenstone’s (1980) work, since these
scholars employed self-validated reports of voting in their
analysis of voter turnout in presidential general elections.
This analysis measures voter turnout by relying on the
actual votes cast in judicial elections.

The Bureau of

Census' operationalization of specific variables were relied
upon and the turnout percents were calculated instead of
employing turnout reports provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau.

Researchers have challenged the validity of using

self-validated reports of voting
Silver
1989).

1986; Silver et al.

(Hill

1984; Anderson and

1986; and Abramson and Claggett

However, Wolfinger and Rosenstone

(1980) contended

that their reports on voter turnout were not distorted by
"misreporting" of voting by the respondents surveyed.
cited the works of Traugott and Katosh

They

(1979) and Weisberg

(1979) on vote validation to support this contention.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone

(1980) did acknowledge

differences in vote percentages revealed by relying upon
survey data as opposed to measuring turnout as a proportion
of the total votes cast by the total voting age population.
According to these scholars

(1980,

115),

estimates of turnout in sample surveys
are always somewhat higher than those
based on the total number of ballots
cast by the aggregate voting-age
population.
Since 1948, reported
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turnout in sample surveys has ranged
between 5 percent and 17 percent higher
than the aggregate estimates....
The
1972 election is no exception....
The
commonly cited aggregate turnout figure
is 55.5 percent while reported turnout
from our Current Population Survey
sample is 66.7 percent, a gap of 11.2
percent.

Wolfinger and Rosenstone <1980,

115) argued that

measuring turnout as a proportion of the total voting age
population casting valid ballots results in an underestima
tion of voting due to the fact that the total voting age
population "includes millions of people who are ineligible
to vote:

aliens,

inmates of prisons and mental

institutions, and ex-convicts who cannot vote in many
states."

Despite this observation, extrapolating total

voting age population over a period of time eliminates some
of these problems.

For example, aliens, prisoners, and

those confined to mental
information forms.

institutions do not complete census

Therefore,

institutionalized individuals

are removed from the total voting age population over time.
Furthermore, since the Census of Population contains a
category listing the number of persons confined to prisons
and mental

institutions, researchers are able to eliminate

these persons from the total voting age population before
calculating turnout percents.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone

(1980,

116) also stated that

"if noncitizens are removed from the denominator

(total

voting age population) of the aggregate computation,

the
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turnout estimate rises from 55.5 percent to 56.7 percent."
This difference is not as significant as the difference
which result when sample surveys are employed to report
turnout.

Based upon Wolfinger and R o senstone’s

observations,

the conclusions presented

and the works of Anderson and Silver
al.

in this analysis,

(1986) and Silver et

(1986); overreporting the estimates of turnout with the

use of sample data presents more of a problem than calculat
ing turnout as a proportion of the total voting age popula
tion casting valid ballots.

According to Silver et al.

(1986), because groups with certain demographic traits are
more likely to overreport voting, research utilizing
individual

level data or surveys is more likely to be

contaminated by individual motivational biases.
example. Silver et al.

For

(1986, 623) found that "more highly-

educated respondents are more likely than less-educated
respondents to try to appear to be in conformity with the
regime norm of voting, even when their actual behavior is
inconsistent with this norm."

This observation may provide

one explanation for the performance of the variable
education in Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) work.
researchers found education to be the most
variable in predicting voter turnout.

These

important

Wolfinger and

Rosenstone concluded that individuals with higher levels of
educational attainment were more likely to vote than those
with less educational attainment.
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Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) also argued that
computations of voter turnout results in underestimation,
since only valid votes are counted.
researchers

(1980,

116),

According to these

"the numerator of the aggregate

percentage represents the total number of valid counted
votes for president.

This excludes people who cast a

spoiled ballot (they think they vote, but their vote is not
counted),

those who go to the polls but do not vote for

president, and people whose votes for miscellaneous write-in
candidates are not tallied."
Wolfinger and Rosenstone

Contrary to this argument,

(1980, 6) excluded from their

analysis "all cases where the respondent did not know if a
vote had been cast or where this information was not
ascertained by the interviewer."
to a certain degree,

These scholars followed,

the measurement technique they

criticized in the aggregate measure of voter turnout.
Another explanation which may explain the differences
revealed by the sociodemographic variables operationalized
in the present study and those included in Wolfinger and
Rosen s t o n e ’s (1980) work

is the level of analysis.

The

present study employs the systemic or aggregate level of
analysis whereas Wolfinger and Rosenstone employed the
individual

level of analysis by relying on survey data.

his discussion of the ecological fallacy, Robinson (1950)
demonstrated that there are differences between findings
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obtain with the use of aggregate data and those obtained
using

individual data.
Third, Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) discussion of

the impact of age on electoral participation was not
comprehensive enough.

These scholars did not take into

consideration the fact that eighteen-year-olds were not
allowed to vote until

1971 with the ratification of the

Twenty-Sixth Amendment.

Arterton (1974) demonstrated that

major political events (e.g.-, war, economic depression, or
political corruption) have tremendous impacts on political
socialization as well as levels of political participation.
According to this scholar,

the generational effect— when

events of a particular era have an enduring effect on
political opinions, preferences, and participation— did have
an impact on the Vietnam generation.

As a result,

these

individuals were found to have less patriotic views than
those older than their group

(Arterton 1974, 269).

Wolfinger and Rosenstone did not discuss the impact the
Vietnam War or the generational effect may have had on
depressing voter turnout among those between the ages of 18
and 25 in the 1972 presidential general elections.

These

individuals were more likely to be drafted to fight in the
war than older Americans.

Furthermore,

the late 1960s and

early 1970s were characterized by many protests or
demonstrations.

As a result, there was a large segment of

American society which was apolitical.
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Fourth, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1970
to remove barriers to voting for blacks
tests).

(e.g,

literacy

It may be argued that some black respondents in

Wolfinger and Rosenstone's

(1980) research either under

reported voting because of a fear and mistrust of the
intentions of the interviewers or overreported as a way to
demonstrate they were carrying out their civic duty and
deserved the right to vote.

Summary
Most of the variables which indicated a strong
correlation with voter turnout when regressed
models performed

in similar manners when placed

general model of voter turnout
fact,

in the simple
in the

in judicial elections.

In

the statistical significance of these variables

improved when placed

in the overall regression equation.

Of the three independent models,
relationship
model.

the strongest

(R2 = +.33) was revealed by the contextual

The two variables yielding the most statistically

significant coefficients in this model were high visibility
election and congressional election.

These two variables

were also found to be significant in the general model.
Judicial elections scheduled concurrently with high
visibility elections

(mayoral or gubernatorial) or

congressional elections had the highest
participation.
Blank

levels of electoral

The performance of these variables supports

(1974) contention that election structure or
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contextual factors are the most important factors in
explaining variations in electoral participation.
Additionally,

the explanatory powers of the variables

presidential election and competition were not as powerful
as the independent variables high visibility and
congressional elections, however,

judicial elections held

concurrently with presidential races and those which were
competitive did have increased levels of voter turnout.
Even though the relationship

(R2 = +.16) revealed by

the candidate model was not as powerful as that explained by
the contextual model

<R2 = +.33),

the variable campaign

spending was found to be a factor in influencing voter
turnout in this model.

The coefficient for this variable in

the general model suggests that greater campaign spending on
the part of judicial candidates increase voter turnout in
judicial races.

This variable remained significant in

explaining variations in voter turnout even when placed in
the general model.

The independent variables prior judicial

office, race of candidate,

and prior elective office were

also found to influence voter turnout in Louisiana
nonpartisan contested

judicial elections.

impact of these variables is considerably
the variable campaign spending,

Even though the
less than that of

their contribution to the

general model should not be ignored.
The only sociodemographic variables which explained
differences in electoral participation were rural percent
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and median family income.

Judicial elections held in rural

areas had higher levels of voter turnout than those held in
urban areas.

Likewise, elections held in districts

consisting of large percentages of voters with high median
family income were characterized by high levels of voter
turnout.
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Chapter Five
Conclusions

The present study attempts to answer two main questions
which have not been examined by judicial scholars.

The

results revealed by the general model of voter turnout have
been analyzed to answer these questions.
is:
prior

The first question

What is the precise relationship between incumbency or
judicial experience, campaign spending,

and the race

of judicial candidates and variations in electoral
participation when other factors are controlled for?
second question is:

The

Is the electorate that participates in

judicial elections typical or atypical of the electorate
that participates in presidential

contests in terms of their

demographic characteristics?
The results of this research suggest that all three of
these variables influenced electoral participation in
Louisiana judicial elections.

The results of the present

analysis indicate that of the three variables of interest,
campaign spending yielded the strongest correlation with
voter turnout in judicial elections.

The race of judicial

candidates as well as incumbency or prior

judicial

experience had less of an impact on electoral participation.
The variable campaign spending was found to encourage
voter participation.

As a result of the low visibility of

judicial elections, particularly nonpartisan elections, when

136
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compared to other elections (e.g, presidential, U.S.
senatorial, gubernatorial, or mayoral),

judicial elections

with high levels of candidate expenditure were expected to
have high levels of electoral participation.

For this

reason, a significant positive relationship was expected and
revealed between campaign spending and electoral
participation in judicial elections.
Whereas scholars have found evidence which suggest the
existence of racial polarization in voting in Louisiana
nonpartisan judicial elections
1988),

(Weber 1988,

1989; Engstrom

the present study demonstrates that the race of

judicial candidates also affects voting behavioi
tion.

participa

The race of these candidates may have an impact on

the preference of voters who decide to participate in
judicial elections as well as increase the saliency of these
contests or electoral participation.
Obviously, voters know enough about the judicial
candidates to vote along racial

lines.

Knowledge of the

race of these candidates serve as a voting cue and a voting
st imulus.
Finally,

incumbency advantage was found to influence

voter participation in judicial races.
sional

Just as congres

incumbents have been found to draw voters to the

polls as a result of their name familiarity among voters and
their ability to raise large sums of campaign expenditures
(Heard 1960; Mayhew 1974; Cover 1977; Jacobson 1980), the
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same is true of judicial

incumbents.

It remains to be

determined whether voters are more likely to vote for
judicial

incumbents rather than challengers.

The second question involves determining whether the
characteristics of voters who participate in presidential
elections are similar or different from the characteristics
of the electorate that participates in judicial elections.
Scholars who have explained variations in voter turnout on
the basis of the sociodemographic characteristics of the
electorate have concluded that the variable education should
have the strongest relationship with turnout

in presidential

general elections (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

The

demographic variable found to be the second most important
according to these researchers was income.
The results of the present analysis suggest that
education was not important.
Rosenstone (1980) found higher

However,

Wolfinger and

levels of education to

increase the probability of voting.

The findings of this

study suggest that judicial elections held in districts
consisting of less educated voters revealed slightly higher
levels of electoral participation than those held in
districts consisting of voters with high
educational attainment.

levels of

Also elections held in districts

with large percentages of white voters,
those between the age of 35 and 69,

lower income blacks,

large percentages of
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white-collar workers were not found to be characterized by
higher

levels of voter turnout.

The variable percentage of the total voting age
population residing

in rural area has been included in this

analysis because the results of existing studies (Key 1949;
Campbell et al.

I960; Blank

1974) suggested a correlation

between rural areas and voter turnout.

The results of this

analysis indicate that elections held in rural areas had
significantly higher
those occurring

levels of voter participation than

in urban areas.

The variable median family income was found to increase
electoral participation.

However,

the explanatory power of

this variable with relations to the dependent variable voter
turnout was not as significant

in judicial races as it was

found to be in presidential general elections

(Wolfinger and

Rosenstone 1980).
The above findings or the relationship between the
sociodemographic variables and electoral participation
suggest that sociodemographics cannot be relied upon to the
same degree when explaining changes in voter turnout

in

judicial elections as they are in presidential elections.
Despite Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) reliance on survey
or individual

level data,

the above observations lead one to

conclude that the electorate that participates in judicial
elections may be somewhat atypical of the electorate that
participates in presidential elections.

The fact that
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electoral participation was higher
concurrently with congressional and

in judicial races held
local and statewide high

visibility races (e.g., gubernatorial

and mayoral) rather

than in judicial contests held concurrently with
presidential general elections support the previous
statement.
Southwell

(1988) concluded in her analysis of

congressional elections that R o s e n s t o n e ’s (1982)
"mobilization" hypothesis explains variations in who
actually participates in different elections.
(1982, 26)

Rosenstone’s

"mobilization" hypothesis is based upon the

assumption that "certain voters are mobilized or encouraged
to vote as a result of the contextual environment present
during an election."

According to Southwell

(1988, 285),

"group differences in voter turnout are susceptible to
change.

It appears unlikely that future researchers will be

able to predict the turnout levels of blacks, working class
individuals,

and the unemployed without a full understanding

of the immediate situation."

The "situation" the author

is

referring to is the economic and political environment
prevalent during particularly elections.
The previous paragraph supports the finding revealed by
the results of the general model

in the present study.

Contextual factors had greater explanatory powers than any
of the other

independent variables.

Other factors,

specifically the personal characteristics of the judicial
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candidates and of the electorate did not explain variations
in voter turnout

in the judicial elections to the same

degree as the contextual variables.

The only exception

being campaign spending.

Implications for Future Research
The present research represents an attempt to provide a
comprehensive model containing characteristics which may
affect electoral participation in judicial elections.
Research has been conducted to explain differences in voter
turnout

in presidential

(Verba and Nie 1972; Ashenfelter and

Kelley 1975; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Conway 1981;
Shaffer

1981), congressional

(Silberman and Durden 1975;

Dawson and Zinser 1976; Caldeira and Patterson 1982), and
gubernatorial

(Jewell and Olson 1982; Patterson and Caldeira

1983) elections.

However,

the same scholarly attention has

not been devoted to explaining variations in electoral
participation in judicial elections.
Hannah
(1980)

(1972), Adamany and Dubois

(1976), and Dubois

did focus on voter turnout but none of these scholars

devised a comprehensive model to explain the impact certain
factors may have on voter turnout in judicial elections. As
a result,
basis.

judicial election research lacks an empirical

Whereas a theoretical framework has been established

by these scholars, empirical testing of these theories has
not been conducted.
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The present study represents the a u t h o r ’s attempt to
fill this void.

It is the hope that.future research efforts

will focus on constructing sound empirical models to explain
differences in voter turnout

in judicial elections.

Considerable knowledge has been devoted to presidential
congressional election studies.

and

Researchers have developed

a body of knowledge, both theoretically and empirically
based,

to explain voter turnout in such elections.

The same

attention needs to be given to examining factors which
encourage or depress electoral participation in judicial
elections.
Not only should future research focus on factors which
stimulate or depress voter turnout in judicial elections,
scholars should examine vote choice in these elections.
Even though scholars have found evidence which suggest that
black voters are more likely to vote for black

judicial

candidates (Sheffield and Hadley 1984; Lovrich and Sheldon
1988; Weber 1988,

1989; Engstrom 1988) and white voters for

white judicial candidates

(Weber 1988,

1989; Engstrom 1988),

the only study which has been conducted to explain vote
choice in nonpartisan judicial elections is Dubois (1984).
As a result, Dubois

(1984, 395) stated that "the subfield of

judicial politics still

lacks a precise understanding of

determinants of voter choice in low salience nonpartisan
judicial elections."
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Future research efforts should also be devoted to
determining whether voters do not participate in state and
local elections placed on the ballot with a national race
because they perceive the ballot as consisting of two
distinct ballots— one, national and the other,
local.

state or

Some distinction on the part of the electorate is

evident,

since voters were more likely to participate in

judicial elections held concurrently with state (congres
sional and gubernatorial)

and local

(mayoral) races rather

than those held during presidential elections.

It remains

to be determined whether there is an across the board
decline in electoral participation in state and local races
held concurrently with presidential elections as opposed to
those held during local, U.S. senatorial,

and other

statewide elections.
Finally, whereas judicial scholars have analyzed the
voting behavior or decision-making patterns of Justices of
the United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
1962; Woodford 1977; Goldman and Sarat

1978; Miller

(Nagel

1978;

Spaeth 1979; Tate 1981), they have not devoted the same
attention to the behavior of judges involved in deciding the
merits of lawsuits challenging

judicial election structures.

One question which should be considered

is:

Why are there

differences in the Fifth and Sixth C i r c u i t s ’ interpretation
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended
1982?

Is this difference in interpretation the result of
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the Circ u i t s ’ response to public opinion,
the courts,

the composition of

the personal attributes of the judges, or the

result of judges relying on voting cues?

Each of these

factors have been examined by scholars who have analyzed the
decision-making of U.S. Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
judges.
Another important question which has not been raised
is:

Is it a conflict of interest for members of the

judiciary to decide matters which may affect them as well as
their colleagues?

In terms of the separation of powers and

checks and balances,

should decisions involving judicial

election processes be left in the hands of judges?
example,

For

judicial elections held in the Fifth Circuit have

been included in analyses by researchers to determine
whether those elections dilute the voting strength of
minorities

(Weber 1988; Engstrom 1988).

Could challenges to

the judicial elections held in the Fifth Circuit account for
differences in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit

judges’

interpretations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965,

as amended 1982, as well as an avoidance on the part

of the Fifth Circuit to address the issue of minority vote
dilution?

Is there an alternative rather than allowing

judges to decide the future of judicial election structures
or processes?
Even though the previously posed questions have not
been analyzed by judicial scholars,

the present analysis
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does provide notable implications for future research.
A noteworthy finding is the relationship between the
scheduling of judicial elections and voter turnout.

The

present research reveals that judicial elections held
concurrently with high visibility elections (gubernatorial
or mayoral)
had higher

and congressional elections

(U.S. senatorial)

levels of voter turnout than those held

simultaneously with presidential general elections.

Despite

this finding the variable presidential election did increase
electoral participation in Louisiana judicial elections.

An

additional factor was the independent variable competition.
More competitive judicial contests were characterized by
higher

levels of electoral participation.

The policy implication of this finding is that the
scheduling or political context

in which

or elections in general occur does affect
turnout in such elections.

judicial elections
levels of voter

Researchers have examined the

problems associated with low voter turnout in American
elections
Held

(Pateman 1970; Burnham 1982,

1987).

1987; Nagel

According to these scholars,

1987;

low voter turnout

is contrary to American democratic principles.

Despite

their concern with low voter turnout and the factors which
affect turnout, these scholars have not considered the
relationship between judicial election scheduling and voter
turnout.
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The performance of the variable campaign spending in
this analysis

alrc has important policy implications.

The

explanatory power of this variable in the general model
suggests that candidates who are able to raise or attract
large campaign expenditures are more likely to stimulate
voter turnout.

Candidates with the availability of funds

are able to increase the salience of judicial elections by
spending more on informing the electorate,

thus giving

themselves an electoral advantage as well as an advantage in
mobilizing voters.
As a result of the important role campaign spending
plays in the judicial election process, one possible policy
which may be implemented to aid candidates who are not able
to raise large sums of campaign spending,

to make acquiring

judgeships more accessible, and to make the electoral
selection of judges a more democratic process may be to
place limitations on the amount of money each judicial
candidate receives from public and other donors.

Just as

expenditure restrictions have been imposed on congressional
candidates,

such restrictions may be necessary in judicial

elections in light of the crucial role such spending has in
those elections.
The findings of the present study should allow for the
mobilization of voters,
tion in judicial races.

thus increasing electoral participa
A knowledge of factors which

increase voter turnout, specifically in judicial elections,
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is very important.

The present research reveals that voter

turnout in judicial elections is affected by the scheduling
of these elections and by the amount of money spent by the
candidates.

Scheduling judicial contests concurrently with

high visibility elections and congressional elections in
addition to placing restrictions on the amount of campaign
expenditures each candidate may receive may prove to be
instrumental

in mobilizing voters to participate in these

el e c t i o n s .
Furthermore,

those judicial candidates with prior

judicial experience, who had previously held elective
office, or were black did stimulate voter turnout.

The

policy ramification of this finding is that if judges are in
fact representatives and it is in the best interest of
particular groups

(e.g., racial or ethnic minorities)

have certain candidates win,

to

then these groups should

support judicial candidates who are more likely to draw
voters to the polls.
analysis,

According to the results of this

the candidates who are more likely to increase the

saliency of judicial elections are those with large campaign
contributions, prior

judicial experience, who have held

elective office, or black candidates.
Similarly,

it would be wise for persons belonging to

the above mentioned groups to support
particularly

judicial candidates

in elections held in rural areas and those held

in districts in which median family income is high.

The

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

148

rationale for the above statement

is that voter turnout was

found to be higher in elections held in rural areas and in
districts consisting of voters with high median family
income.
In conclusion,

the present study is an attempt to

provide insight into the judicial election process.
Obviously, much research needs to be conducted to explain
what is occurring in terms of challenges to state judicial
elections structures.

Scholars cannot limit their research

efforts to providing mere discussions of lawsuits
challenging

judicial election processes without providing

some type of critical analysis of the entire situation.
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U.S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Congress, 2d Session 28-29,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative
News 177, 206-7, which accompanied the bill amending Section
2,
noted seven typical factors and two additional factors to
be
considered probative of a Section 2 violation.
1.

the extent of any history of official
discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the
members of the minority group to register, to
vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process;

2.

the extent to which voting in the elections
of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized;

3.

the extent to which the state or political
subdivision has used unusually large election
districts, majority vote requirements, anti
single shot provisions, or other voting
practices or procedures that may enhance the
opportunity for discrimination against the
minority group;

4.

if there is a candidate slating process,
whether the members of the minority group
have been denied access to that process;

5.

the extent to which members of the minority
group in the state or political subdivision
bear the effects of discrimination in such
areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process;

6.

whether political campaigns have been
characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals; and

7.

the extent to which members of the minority
group have been elected to public office in
the jurisdiction.

Additional factors that in some cases have had probative
value as part of p l aintiffs’ evidence to establish violation
are ;
A.

Whether there is a significant lack of
responsiveness on the part of elected
officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group; and
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B.

Whether the policy underlying the state or
political subdivision's use of such voting
qualifications, prerequisite to voting, or
standard, or procedure is tenuous.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

Appendix Two

167

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

168
(1)

Incumbency or Prior Judicial Experience**
-Coded 1 = "yes" (Candidates who have previously held
judgeships), O = "no" (Candidates with no judicial
ex p e r i e n c e ).

(2)

Race of Candidate**
-Coded 1 = "Black" 0 = "White".

(3)

Campaign Spending
Total campaign spending in each election_____
Voting age population in each district
-Measuring campaign expenditure in this manner controls
for the impact the size of districts may have on
c a n d i d a t e s ’ spending (Dubois, 1980, 1984).
-Finance information was drawn from official documents
filed by candidates with the Louisiana Campaign Finance
Off i c e .

(4)

Prior Elective Office
-Coded 1 = "yes" (Candidates who have previously held
elective offices, excluding judgeships), 0 = "no"
(Candidates with no prior elective experience).
-This information was drawn from the biographies of
judges included in The American B e n c h .

(5)

Type of Election**
-Coded 1 = "General" 0 = "Primary".

(6)

Age*
-Percentage of total population aged 35 through 69.

(7)

Income*
— Median Family Income.
-For districts containing 2 or more parishes, median
family income was computed as a weighted average of
family income as a proportion of families in each
parish.

(8)

Education*
-Percentage of persons 18 and over within each district
who are high school graduates.

(9)

White Registered Voters
-Proportion of total registered voters who are white.
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-Measured as follows:

# of white registered voters
total registered voters

-This information was provided by the Louisiana Office
of Secretary of State.
(10) Rural*
-Proportion of total population residing
areas.

in rural

-Calculated as follows: ____________ rural_______________
total population
(11) White-collar Workers*
-Percentage of population over 16 years old employed in
white-collar occupations.
(12) High Visibility Election***
-Coded: 1 = "yes" (gubernatorial or mayoral election)
O = "no".
(13) Presidential Election***
-Coded; 1 = "yes" (Presidential election occurring)
0 = "no".
(14) Congressional Election***
-Coded: 1 = "yes" (U.S. Senatorial election occurring)
0 = no.
(15) Competition**
Total votes received by the winner minus the total
votes received by the runnei— up as a proportion of the
total votes cast.
-The lower the percentage,
election.

the more competitive the

(16) Black Median Family Income*
-For districts consisting of 2 or more parishes, black
family income was calculated as a weighted average of
black median income as a proportion of black families
in each parish.

*This information was taken from data collected by the U.S.
Department of Commerce publication Census of
Population.
**This data was drawn from the data compiled by Professor
Ronald E. Weber (1988) as an expert witness in Clark v .
E dwards.
**This information was obtained by using the Almanac of
American Politics.
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CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE SUMMARY
Parish and/or District ______________
Date of Primary

Candidate

Office Sought _________

_______________ Date of General _____________

Period

Expenditure
During Period

Expenditure
Aggregating
Period

180th Day Prior
to Primary
90th Day Prior
to Primary
30th Day Prior
to Primary
10th Day Prior
to Primary
10th Day Prior
to General
40th Day After
General
Annual Report
Supplemental
Report
Annual Report
Supplemental
Report
Annual Report
Supplemental
Report
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